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University9 Hayward)p with whom this journey began: 
...whose search for truth and wisdom called me to 
my own task and lit the way* 
1. 
Introduction 
Man can be described as the being who shows himself in 
speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking, 
Communication is so close to us? so woven into our very being* 
that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; 
for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it 
is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not 
alike. There are two basic modes of communication, the inau-
thentic and the authentic9 between which there occurs a 
constant tension» 
It is in the inauthentic mode9 points out Heidegger, that 
we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 
1. Being and Time$ pg» 68 
Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in 
taking up its task of having being as an issue for it* 
ff
.8.it can, in its very being fchoose1 itself and win 
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or 
only ffseemff to do so. But only in so far as it is 
essentially something which can be authentic—that is* 
something of its own—can it have lost itself and not 
yet won itself *f? 
2e 
therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness". Caught up 
in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and 
3 
conceals our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness 
of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from 
Heideggerfs use of the image of "clearing11 to depict being as 
2. ibid* pg, 69 
"Daseinfs average everydayness, however, is not to be taken 
as a mere faspect'• Here too, and even in the mode of 
inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies 
a priori and here too Daseinfs being is an issue for it in 
a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the 
mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode 
of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof«!t 
3. ibid, pg. 59 
"covering over" and "concealing" are ways Dasein tries 
to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. 
"•..This being can be covered up so extensively that it 
becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its 
meaning..." How everyday speaking accomplishes this will 
be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores 
Dasein1s everyday speech. 
4. ibid, pg. 171 
".•.we have in mind nothing other than the Existential -
ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it iss 
in such a way as to be its 'there1• To say that it is 
'illuminated1 ["erleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-the-
world it is cleared [gelichtetj in itself, not through any 
other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the 
clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially 
cleared in this way does what is present~at~hand become 
accessible in the light or hidden in the dark* ».." 
3 
dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore 
the nature of communication in general and then to explore each 
of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthen-
tic mode of communication can be explored by asking the follow-
ing questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is 
speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in 
his speech? 
The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with 
which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals9 so the 
authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity 
makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. 
Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking 
the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of 
the inauthentic mode. 
Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic 
mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the 
darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All 
through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme9 have, upon 
uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep long-
ing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times 
denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 
4. 
flight is twice mistaken: first it attempts to fix truth as 
unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth 
which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth 
and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The 
Origin of The--Work of Arts 
The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, 
is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal 
is no lack or privation, as if truth could be 
simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it 
could be that, it would no longer be itself. 
...Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.-* 
Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness 
possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to 
realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because 
it no longer maintains the contingency of its task* i.e., the 
dis-closedness of being. 
We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from 
darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond 
the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the 
Republic9 Socrates1 explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to 
Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted 
place". 
5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 
5. 
Come then, I said, and join me in this further 
thought, and do not be surprised that those who 
attained to this height are not willing to occupy 
themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls 
ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that 
sojourn above. For this* I take it, is likely if 
in this point too the likeliness of our image 
holds. 6 
Despite the attraction to pure truths human communication 
is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and 
picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the 
way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended* OUT OF THE 
DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT—AGAIN AND AGAIN, It must be this 
way because this is what it means to be human. This is the 
point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, 
standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: 
Er findet sich in einem ewigen Glg^fe^ 
Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebrachts 
Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht*? 
^
m
 Republic, (517 c & d) 
It should be noted however, that while the philosopher-
king must be compelled to return to the cave for purely 
political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of 
the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth 
and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth* 
7
- Faust, pg. 188 
6* 
This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise 
to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic 
and authentic modes and paying close attention to their inter-
relationship and to their relationship to language as "the 
house of Being": language that both covers and opens up manfs 
rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, 
taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. 
7. 
Chapter I 
All Communication Arises Out of Being 
Man (Dasein) misunderstands the nature of communication 
altogether. He does so because he has forgotten his ontological 
roots. He is the being who shows himself in speech; this show-
ing is a two-fold revelation that reflects his forgetfulness or 
remembrance of his rootedness in being* 
Man comes into an already existent world and is addressed 
through things in the world which are constituted as objects by 
us in their givenness. This requires our response and means 
that man is first of all a listener before he is a speaker. 
"Hearing is constitutive for discourse/ Listening can listen 
it 3 
to what is being said or it can listen away (hinhoren). If 
such listening is inattentive then speaking in response will be 
distorted because it has not heard the speaker or what is spoken 
about. When such listening attends to what the speaking concerns 
1* Being and Time, pg, 53 
2* ibid, pg* 206 
3. ibid, pg* 207 
8. 
appropriately, listening constitutes harkening (Horchen)^ i.e., 
listening which understands* The way Dasein listens will 
determine box* it will speak. 
Dasein grasps the world through speech which represents the 
world in words. Here, grasp may be understood in two ways; either 
as mastery or as response. If it is understood as mastery, the 
world is seen in its objectivity as out there, as other and not 
mine; it is to be subjugated. Speech becomes manipulative in 
order to keep things from being seen as what they are, and 
thereby covers over being* Being is covered over when speech 
fails to show or illustrate the entities named in the word in 
their referential totality: 
Men have always to do with being in that they are 
always dealing with entities*, it is alien to them 
in that they turn away from being because they do 
not grasp it...they are awake in relation to the 
entities, and yet being is hidden from them... 
They thrash about amid the entities, always 
supposing that what is most tangible is what 
4. ibid, pg. 316 
* The substitution of the word, "entities" for Tlessents,f is 
due to the fact that there is no such word as "essents" 
in the English language. 
9. 
they must grasp and each man grasps what is 
closest to him* The one holds to this, the other 
to thatj each manfs opinion hinges on his own 
opinionatedness. This opinionatedness, this 
obstinacy prevents them from reaching out to 
what is gathered together in itself, makes it 
impossible to be followers,5 
The word confines the thing to the ontic level by ignoring the 
relationship of the thing to other things and to Dasein itself. 
This dis-regard for the totality of relationships will become 
more clear as we proceed. Man as speaker is in un-truth or 
conceals being. By contrast, response as a way of grasping the 
world, grants the world its worldhood and considers (sides with) 
the entities, in the sense of caring for them, by allowing them 
to show themselves as what they are, Rather than covering over 
being as in the case of mastery, response re-adresses the 
entities by making a place for their essence to be seen. Man 
remembers his ontological roots and is in truth, a-letheia, 
discovering being. This journey of dis-covery is not an 
Instantaneous one, rather, Dasein moves gradually along its way 
from the ontic to the ontological—from forgetfulness to remem-
brance. So too, our own inquiry must pass gradually from 
5* Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 110 
10. 
exploring the mastery of everyday speech that is forgetful, to 
responsive speaking that remembers its rootedness in being. 
We might note that a distinction has emerged in the use of 
speech that might help further our understanding of the nature 
of communications "speaking" that covers over should be termed 
talk or talking while that which reveals being should be termed 
saying or speaking. Man is the cross-road for both possibilities; 
the way is always open to him to return to the path of dis-
covery; for he has lost sight of himself as speaker, covering 
over his own task of becoming, i.e., coming into being: 
...For to be a man is to speak. Man says yes and no 
only because in his profound essence he is a speaker, 
the speaker. That is his distinction and at the same 
time his burden. ...(Even if man were as the gods in 
all other respects)••.and did not include the power 
of speech, all entities would be closed to us, the 
entities that we ourselves are no less than the 
entities that we are not.6 
Man loses sight of himself as speaker because there is an 
already existent speech into which man is thrown^which has pre-
determined structures and meanings. Things are viewed and 
spoken of in traditional ways, dissipating the power of speech. 
6. ibid, pg. 69 
11, 
The historicity out of which speech expressed the truth of man's 
encounter with the world has long been covered over in its public 
appropriation and been lost. Such talk has lost its way of 
bringing the happening to bear or illustrating it in its 
essential nature; all that is left are empty words: 
But the emptiness of the word beingj the total 
disappearance of its appellative force, is not 
merely a particular instance of exhaustion of 
speech; rather the destroyed relation to being 
as such is the actual reason for the general 
misrelation to speech.7 
Words are the frame of an empty house in which no one lives, 
Who resides there? Not the speaker; nor is what is spoken about 
its furnishings. The speaker is everyone and no one at all. 
The talk is about everything and nothing at all. This emptiness 
is covered over by generating more and more empty words which 
stand row on row like uncompleted houses of an abandoned sub-
division. In showing himself "as the entity which talks"°, words 
pour forth from man in streams. It is almost as if the bankruptcy 
7. ibid, pg. 42 
8, Being and Time, pg* 208 
12. 
of such talk were kept at a distance by the sheer volume of words, 
Man sees this talking as setting himself apart from all other 
being, thereby granting himself superior status. The ability to 
speak is the condition for being human. 
The advent of the word manifests the sovereignty 
of man. Man interposes a network of words between 
the world and himself and thereby becomes master 
of the world.9 
Mastery of the world lies in manfs command of speech.10 He 
dominates speech by confining it to the ontic level. To speak 
is to name things, but naming things under manfs domination of 
speech distorts naming. In naming things, familiar objects are 
locked into a pre-determined form that designates how entities 
are to give themselves. Only so much of what is given is to be 
considered. What is left out of this naming is the thinghood of 
9
* Speaking, pg. 7 
10. Poetry, Language* and^Thought, pg. 146 
* See discussion of the substitution of the word "speech" 
for "language" on pg. 30. Hereafter this title will be 
translated as Poetry, Speech and Thought. 
"...there rages about the earth an unbridled and yet clever 
talking^writing, broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as 
though he were the shaper and master of speech; while in 
fact speech remains the master of man. Perhaps it is 
before all else manfs subversion of this relation of 
dominance that drives his nature into alienation." 
13. 
the thing. It is no longer to be considered. To insure this 
distance, entities are considered apart from the way they are 
in their totality. The unity of the thing is kept at bay— 
kept from its gatheredness* The denial of the thinghood empties 
the word by suppressing the being of the thing so it canft be 
gathered. Things are looked at in terms of only this or that 
attribute or purpose. The control over phenomena forces the 
world to be grasped at the ontic level. For example, trees are 
seen In terms of being building supply material, men solely in 
terms of the work they produce e.g., painting, teaching or 
legislating. Our words allow only this to be seen and no more— 
thus we close ourselves off from the world by depriving it of 
its worldhood. We lose the world by severing the thinghood from 
the thing, "The nature of the thing never gets a hearing". 
Man does indeed name things in his speaking; but if this 
speaking is manipulative, it cannot show the nature of a thing 
in an un-concealed manner because such speaking does not show 
the thing in its thinghood. This way of speaking Heidegger 
11. ibid, pg. 170 
14. 
attributes to sciencess way of speaking of things which is 
after all correct for science speaking scientifically. ^ This 
abstraction of the thinghood from the thing is incorrect when 
carried over into that speaking which is a-scientific* Our 
mania for a purely objective world, detached from the kind of 
thought that refuses such abstraction and refuses as well to be 
insistent,^ has become a point of pride. The distance we put 
between ourselves and things insures that they (things) will not 
remind us of their thinghood and in return require us to re-
address them out of our own essence or way to be. The flight 
from naming that reveals, that is not manipulative, is shown is 
the fairy tale, "Rumpelstiltskin". 
Rumpelstiltskin strikes a bargain with the queen: If she 
12. ibid 
13* Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 138 
The problem of insistence is a persistent one and one we 
shall have to return to in the following chapters, Daseinss 
insistence manifests itself as arrogance and presumption in 
imposing its will that entities be considered on the ontic 
level. "The evaluation of being-human as arrogance and 
presumption in the pejorative sense takes man out of his 
essential need as the in-cident. To judge in this way is 
to take man as something already-there, to put something 
into an empty space and appraise it according to some 
external table of values...". 
15* 
can guess his name in three days time she can keep the child he 
has come to take. The queen searches throughout the kingdom 
for someone who knows his name but no one does. The "little man" 
himself gives his name away; he names his nature; Rumpelstiltskin 
means hobgoblin. Is Rumpelstiltskinfs rage the result of losing 
the child or is it because in his being named, his nature is 
exposed thereby placing him in the queenfs power? The power 
humans have is the power of dis-closure* Disclosure holds the 
entity forth as what it is. Because Rumpelstiltskin is not a 
thing but an "evil creature", his nature can?t bear the light of 
revelation and he flees. He becomes part of the earth by 
partially sinking into it; if this weren?t far enough from the 
light of dis-closure, he takes his free leg and tears himself 
asunder, severing himself from the earth. His flight reflects 
man's own avoidance of being. As we shall see later, man flees 
the being there of this being by seeking to become a thing and 
losing himself in the dispersal he reserves for things at the 
ontic level. He covers over their being and his own as well. 
14. Grimm1s Fairy Tales, pg, 51 
16. 
Where Rumpelstiltskin succeeds in annihilation, man reveals the 
possibility for recovery; even his covering over discloses 
being. But what exactly does this mean? We have mentioned 
"covering over" in the introduction and this chapter without 
being quite clear as to its nature. We must also answer the 
question as to just how "covering over" being can at the same 
time reveal or disclose being. 
"Covering over" is an activity, so it must have an initia-
tor » This initiator is man. What is it that man covers over? 
The answer of course, is being; but further elaboration is 
needed here. Dasein, in his dis-regard for being refuses to let 
entities be seen in their thinghood, absents himself from the 
referential totality by hiding, disguishing or burying it. 
There are various ways in which phenomena can be 
covered up* In the first place, a phenomenon 
can be covered up in the sense that it is still 
quite undis covered. It is neither known nor 
unknown. Moreover a phenomenon can be buried 
over [verschtittet]. This means that it has at 
some time been discovered but at some point has 
deteriorated [verfiel] to the point of getting 
covered up again. This covering-up can be 
complete; or rather—and as a rule—what has 
been discovered earlier may still be visible, 
though only as a semblence. ...This covering-
up as a 'disguising1 is both the most frequent 
17. 
and the most dangerous, for here the 
possibilities of deceiving and misleading 
are especially stubborn.15 
Thus "covering over" shows that Dasein*s way-to-be toward being 
is one of refusal; "covering over" shows or lets be seen how 
1 ^  
Dasein stands toward being by not standing toward it. 
We must now return to the problem of distortion in naming 
things. Such distortion arises because of Dasein*s insistence1* 
in dominating language. To say naming in this manner distorts, 
carries with it the presupposition that naming in and of itself 
does not mean subjugation or mastery of the thing named. What 
other possibility is there? 
There is the possibility that naming is a response* We 
have said previously, that the way man speaks depends on how 
he listens; on how attentive he is to what is being said. If 
listening lets saying be said, then speaking will be a naming 
which responds. It will not aim at mastery or domination of 
15. Being and Time, pg. 60 
16. The reason Dasein covers over being and the relationship 
of covering over to un-truth and the lack of freedom will 
be taken up further on. 
17. See Ft. N. 13, pg. 14 of this chapter. 
18. 
speech. Here we hesitate, for we encounter a number of per-
plexing questions: What could speech possibly be apart from 
Daseinfs domination of it? More specifically, could it be at 
all; could there be speech apart from man's domination of it? 
What would such speech "look" like; what would be its constitu-
tion? Lastly, an unwelcome thought comes to our attention, 
brought forward by the direction our questions seem to be taking: 
If man does not bring speech about, "does speech bring man about 
or into existence"?1^ This question looks very much as though 
man will not be speaker—but who speaks if man does not? Our 
questions echo a resistance born of our reluctance to let go of 
the "prized" hold that our ancestors so tenaciously have 
bequeathed to us over the eonsi the disregard for being. 
This "letting go" of the disregard for being means that 
speech will no longer be closed off to being. Clearly what is 
required then is nothing less than the restoration of ontology 
to speech. We must! 
18. Poetry, Speech and Thought, pg. 192 
19. 
...attempt to regain the unimpaired strength of 
speech* and words; for words and speech are not 
wrappings in which things are packed for the 
commerce of those who write and speak. It is in 
words and speech that things first come into being 
and are. For this reason the misuse of speech in 
idle talk, in slogans and phrases, destroys our 
authentic relation to things.19 
We are contemplating letting things be seen the way they are; 
but as we think this another question forms itself and brings us 
up shorti If we let things be seen the way they are won't they 
remind us of our own rootedness in being? Won't we remember our 
own task? We become apprehensive as we face the last question: 
Who are we without our mastery and domination? 
That man is first a listener bears repeating. Without our 
mastery we no longer have reason to listen away but now can 
attend to what is being said. Said? Said how? Does the pen 
on the table speak or the chair by the wall or the tree against 
the building? In what way can they be said to speak, we demand. 
The pen for instance is not merely to write with but it gives 
itself as pointing to the paper which points to the table which 
See discussion of the substitution of the word "speech" 
for "language" on pg. 30. 
19. Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 11 
20. 
points to the floor. The pen gives itself in a network of 
20 
relationships* The chair is not merely to sit in but is freed u 
to refer to the wall, the floor, to me as holding me. 
In letting entities be involved so that they 
are freed for a totality of involvements one 
must have disclosed already that for which 
[woraufhin] they have been freed.21 
The totality of involvements entities are freed for,is the world. 
The pen and the chair are not merely objects of use nor are they 
to be taken apart from the context in which they give themselves. 
What we are attending to then is the givenness of the thing in 
its totality, Listening, then, lets the thing give itself to be 
named. It gives itself in a contextual reference as having a 
world—"beworlded"; as referring to other entities in the world 
and thereby to the world as a whole. Listening hears the appeal 
of the thing in its thinghood and responds to that appeal by 
paying attention to the way the thing is in its referential 
totality and preserves what it hears for saying. Listening 
20. This issue will be taken up in detail in the chapter on 
authentic communication. 
21. Being and Time, pg. 118 
21. 
listens toward this totality in that it "har-kens" (Horchen) 
i.e., understands its involvement in apprehending the totality 
of these relationships i.e., the world as bearing upon its own 
task of having being as an issue for it. The essential nature 
of the thing as in the world is expressed or said in speech in 
naming things, "...essence and being express themselves in 
speech..." 
What could speech possibly be apart from Daseinfs domination 
of it?" Speech could be itself; speech could say itself. Speech 
saysi it co-re-sponds i.e., It answers in a like manner, in a 
manner that is appropriate to the appeal that listening has heard. 
This would imply that speech speaks; that speech says what gives 
itself to speech; it names the thing in its thinghood and in so 
doing names what is given. 
...Speech speaks by saying, that is by showing. 
What it says wells up from the formerly spoken 
and so far still unspoken Saying which pervades 
the design of speech. Speech speaks in that 
it, as showing, reaching into all regions of 
22. ibid, pg. 207 
23. Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 44 
22. 
presences, summons from them what ever is present 
to appear and to fade. We, accordingly, listen 
to speech in this way, that we let it say its 
Saying to us.24 
Such naming names in response to listening, "...naming 
calls."^ It summons things forth from their undifferentiated-
ness elevating them from nothing to something, i.e., calls things 
into existence out of their formlessness and gives them form. 
The form it gives is the word. Summons? Calls? What a strange 
manner of speaking. We may understand calling in the sense of 
calling to someone to gain or demand their attention, but that 
does not seem to help us here* Perhaps raising a question can 
clarify the situation. How does naming something, "trees", for 
example, call "tree" into the word and what can this possibly 
mean? Can we say that naming demands a thing be thus and so? 
Surely not, because we would find ourselves returning to mastery. 
The thing gives itself to be formed in the word. Naming responds 
to this giving. This would imply no insistence. No, we have to 
look at calling again. 
24. Poetry,^-Speech and Thought, pg. 124 
25. ibid, pg. 198 
23. 
Suppose naming calls graciously, i.e., bids or invites^*0 
the thing to be what it is in the word. Naming calls the thing 
near", into the word so that it can stand out and be what it 
is—present in its absence. Calling brings the tree near, not 
by making it physically present at my elbow, but by gathering 
28* its essential nature in the word. Do we mean to say that in 
26. What is Called Thinking, pg. 117 
"...And the old word "to call" means not so much command as 
a letting-reach, that therefore the "call" has an assonance 
of helpfulness and complaisance, is shown by the fact that 
the same word in Sanskrit still means something like "to invite". 
27. This nearness to which calling calls is not the concern of 
everyday language because for everyday language "...everything 
present is equally near and equally far. The distancelessness 
prevails." (Poetry, Speech and Thought, pg. 177) The near 
into which things are called by naming, makes room for the 
thing by letting the thing be seen in its totality. Naming 
names this totality of relationships and in so doing opens 
a place for the world through the thinghood, of things. 
"the world grants to things their present. Things bear the 
world. World grants things." (Poetry, Speech and Thought, 
pg. 202) 
28. On The Way To Speech, pg. 126 
* See the discussion of the substitution of the word "speech" 
for "language" on pg. 30. 
"Saying is the gathering which joins all appearance of 
the in itself manifold showing which everywhere lets all 
that Is shown abide within itself." 
24. 
naming a thing, the word has the power to bring a thing into 
being? Exactly so! In On The Way To Speech, Heidegger in 
speaking of Stephan George's poem, "The Word", points out that 
"...something is only where the appropriate and therefore com-
petent word names a thing as being. 7 The word provides a 
place for the thing as' it is given; the word gives ground to the 
being of things and "creates" a space for it: 
The word's rule springs to light as that which 
makes the thing be a thing. The word begins to 
shine as the gathering which brings what presences 
to its present... The oldest word for the rule 
of the word thus thought, for Saying is logos: 
Saying which in showing, lets beings appear in 
their "it is". .s»The same word, however for 
Saying, is also the word for Being, that is for 
the presencing of beings. Saying and Being, 
word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled 
way... All essential Saying harkens back to 
this mutual belonging of Saying and Being, word 
and thing.30 
Let us retrace our steps for a moment, as we seem to have 
passed too hurriedly over the two additional aspects of naming: 
that of gathering and showing. Naming shows something as what 
29• ibid, pg. 63 
30. ibid, pg* 155 
25. 
it is. Very well, but what does it mean to show? To show means 
to exhibit something, that is, to let it be seen. What is it 
that is exhibited in the word? That which makes a tree a tree. 
The word "tree" shows or exhibits the treeness of tree. What it 
means to be a tree, i.e., the essential nature of a tree is 
gathered into a word and shown: 
Saying is showing. In everything that speaks 
to us, in everything that touches us by being 
spoken about, in everything that gives itself 
to speaking, or waits for us unspoken, but also 
in that speaking we do ourselves, there prevails 
showing which lets* appear what is present,.•• . 
Saying is in no way linguistic expression added 
to the phenomena after they have appeared— 
rather, all radiant appearance and all fading 
away is grounded in the showing saying. Saying 
sets all present beings free into their given 
presence and lets (them) disappear into their 
absence as long as (they) are absent.** Saying 
%-k 
The substitution of "lets" for "cause" in Hertz's translation 
correctly returns to the meaning Heidegger intends here. 
Showing does not cause entities to appear in the sense of 
cause and effect. Indeed the verb in the German edition of 
Unterwegs^Zur Sprache, Pfulligen, 1959 pg. 257, is 
"entscheinen lasst", which means to grant permission. 
There is the same problem with the second half of this 
sentence as well as the additional problem of leaving out 
the durational aspect of "jeweiliges". Hertz's translation 
of the sentence reads: "Saying sets all present beings free 
into their given presence, and brings what is absent into 
their absence." The German edition is as follows: "Sie 
befreit Anwesendes in sein jeweiliges Anwesen, entfreit 
Abwesendes in sein jeweiliges Abwesen*" 
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pervades and structures the openness of that 
clearing*** which every appearance must seek 
out and every disappearance leave behind, and 
in which every present or absent being must 
show or announce itself.31 
But now we seem to have three elements of naming; calling, 
gathering and showing; we began by looking at only one, calling. 
Do we have three different things or just one? Does calling 
gather and show the thing? Is gathering having been called and 
shown? Is showing what has been called and gathered? Can we 
give a name to naming that encompasses all three aspects? The 
answer is yes. The possession of naming is logical. Logos 
encompasses all three aspects of naming. 
The word then, is the "dwelling place" of being; "...speech 
32 
is the house of being." Calling invites the thing to be 
present^ in the word, to show itself as it is by laying hold 
*** The "clearing" is important to Heidegger?s thought and it 
will be looked at in detail in the third chapter, "Extra-
ordinary Speaking: Authentic Communication". 
31. ibid, pg. 126 
32. ibid, pg. 63 
33. What Is Called Thinking, pg. 118 
"...To call means: to call into arrival and presence; to 
address commendingly." 
27. 
of the thing and through keeping it; lets it emerge into truth, 
[bewahren] in the sense of preserving it in its presentness. 
How are we to understand the way the word keeps and pre-
serves the thing in its presentness? Is it understood in the 
sense that we recall a past definition of the tree and by saying 
it the word "makes present" by showing "tree" as having been 
constituted and already given previously? This is not a likely 
prospect, since the word would, like Nietzsche!s "glass coffin" 
entomb the past and there trap the thing closing off its possi-
bility of (its) being presented in its unity. What would be 
presented is the thing the way it was: the thing as having been. 
The thing would be closed off from being shown in its referential 
totality. What would appear is not the thing but the fixedness 
of the thing—indeed this is what would be shown. The thing would 
be denied its significance. The word would await the thing and 
admit or show the thing only partially. If the word is to reveal 
the thing as it is, time as the horizon of being, will have to 
be understood another way. That way will have to admit, not a 
34. Thus Spake Zarathustra, pg. 246 
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fragmented thing being as having been, that is, without its 
potential of appearing any other way, but the thing in its 
totality: as having been given, as past, as well as open to the 
future in the present, i.e., not as being confined to a given 
context. What do we mean by context? What does context have to 
do with temporality? Tree is not given independently of its 
being in a forest or by a clearing or on a mountain top. When 
the temporality of a thing is ignored or forgotten, the givenness 
of a thing in a new context is also forgotten and its meaning Is 
confined to the past and held captive there. So that a thing 
may not lose its meaning, what is required is a temporal ecstasis: 
the thing as having been is, as its "not-yet", here and now. 
The givenness gives itself to be called, gathered and shown. 
What is made present then is the presence of presentness. The 
un-said is admitted—let in and let be. What is the unsaid that 
is said? The word grants the thing: "esgibt". To admit some-
35 thing Is to send it forth. What is sent with the thing is its 
unity. This unity is "the simple one-fold" intimacy of thing 
35. Webster?s New World Dictionary, pg. 10 
36. Poetry, SpeechandThought, pg. 207 
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and world. It is this intimacy that is the stillness expressed 
by human speech; stillness bears the unity of being and time. 
The two, being and time are spoken as one; the appearance and 
that which appears are gathered and shown: 
Speaking speaks asthe peal ofstillness» Still-
ness stills by carrying out, the bearing and 
enduring, of world and things in their presence... 
The peal of stillness is not anything human. 
But on the contrary, the human is indeed in its 
nature given to speech. The word "speech" as 
it is here used means having taken place out of 
the speaking of speech. What has thus taken place, 
human being, has been brought into its own by 
speech, so that it remains given over or appro-
priated to the nature of speaking, the peal of 
stillness. Such an appropriating takes place in 
so far as the nature of speaking, the peal of 
stillness (presencing)* needs** the speaking of 
* "8..das Gelaut der Stille.*.", appears in the German edition 
but is replaced by Hofstadter with the word, presencing", 
** Discussion of the verb, "needs" ("braucht" in the German 
edition) must proceed very carefully. Just as it is crucial 
in the understanding of manfs relation to being, it is a 
most difficult concept and tends to lead our thinking 
astray. I have also omitted the verb, "uses" which 
Hofstadter co-joins with "needs" since it does not appear 
in the German edition and adds little to clarify the 
understanding of the sentence. 
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mortals in order to sound as the peal of still-
ness for the hearing of mortals. Only as men belong 
within the peal of stillness are mortals able to 
speak in their own way in sounds. 
...What is purely bidden in mortal speech is what is 
spoken poetically. Poetic speaking is never a 
higher mode (melos) of everyday speech. It is 
rather the reverse: everyday speech is a forgotten 
and used up poetizing, from which there hardly re-
sounds a call any longer.37 
"Speaking" has been substituted for "language" in this quote 
(and other places where appropriate also). This substitution 
brings us to a fundamental criticism of Hofstadterfs translation 
(here we must also include other translators of Heideggerfs works 
who show the same lack of understanding as Hofstadter) of 
Heideggerfs essay, "Die Sprache", from Unterwegs Zur Sprache, 
which is given the title, "Language". This is not a mere 
quibble over the substitution of two inter-changeable words based 
on personal preference; rather, it points to the elusive realiza-
tion that the basic point Heidegger is making, is precisely that 
these two words are not interchangeable. The same mistake is 
made by Hertz in translating several different essays from 
Unterwegs Zur Sprache. The title should be translated On The Way 
37. ibid, pg, 207-208 
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To Speech, since the entire series of lectures collected under 
that title concerns human speaking and the experience man 
DO 
undergoes with speaking. He undergoes no such experience 
with language. Language is an abstract structure of speaking 
which is mechanistically oriented; its concern is with the 
mechanics of speech not speech as discourse which discovers or 
covers over, shows or hides being. There are languages in which 
man speaks, e.g., English, German, or French, etc., but in 
whatever language he speaks, it is his speaking, not the language 
spoken which is the ground for his relatedness to being. It is 
for these reasons that the substitution has been made where 
appropriate. 
This passage exhibits another flaw in Hofstadterfs transla-
tion. The German edition reads as follows: "Das rein Geheissene 
des sterblichen Sprechens ist das Gesprochene des Gedichtes.". 
Hofstadter translates this as: "What is purely bidden in mortal 
speech is spoken in the poem." This translation loses sight of 
the difference between "extra-ordinary" speaking and "everyday" 
38. On The Way To Speech, pg. 57* 
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speaking. It is not that we must go about speaking in meter and 
rhyme as Hofstadterfs translation indicates but that "poetic 
speaking", iGedichte] clears the way or discovers being. The 
same is true of "poetizing" or jGedichtJ in the last sentence of 
this paragraph where Hofstadter has "...everyday speech is a 
forgotten and used up poem." The German edition has: "Vielmehr 
vernutztes GetfLcht...". 
We must now break our discussion off here and take up the 
question which we so far have left unanswered" "If man does not 
bring speaking about, does Speaking bring man about or into 
existence?1". The answer is yes; neither can be without the 
other. Man needs speech, but at the same time speech needs man: 
...Speech needs human speaking, and yet it is not 
merely of the making or the command of our speech 
activity...39 
Dasein can either forget, in which case speech "makeCs) present" 
or confines entities to being as ha^ i^ng. been (here Dasein takes 
revenge against time and "it was" and closes itself off from 
future possibilities); or Dasein can remember, letting speech. 
39. On The Way To Speech, pg. 125 
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speak, that is, show entities in their referential totality. 
Entities give themselves, that is, address man; they can appear, 
but the referential totality is significant only for Dasein. 
Such a task is Daseinfs alone. 
What has been presented in this chapter is an overview of 
the nature of communication as it arises from its ontological 
roots. We have deliberately refrained from beginning with an 
assumed definition of communication. We have dealt mainly with 
entities which address Dasein with the important exception of 
entities which are themselves Dasein (except quite generally). 
We have intentionally withheld from view, and find missing, man 
as speaker; for he has been limited to the important role of 
listener. We must now turn to Dasein as speaker; for not only 
is Dasein in the world with other entities (Mit-sein) but it 
must de-cide how or the way it will be in the world with them. 
Certain structures are: 
40. See Ft. N. 1 on page 1 of the Introduction. 
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...equiprimordial with being in the world: being-
with and Dasein-with [Mit-sein und Mitiiasein]. 
In this kind of being is grounded the mode of 
everyday being-onefs Self [Selbstsein]; the 
explication of this mode will enable us to see 
what we may call the 'subject1 of everydayness— 
the "one"*.41 
* "One" has been substituted for "they" because it doesn't 
make sense to say, "I am they". There is precedence for 
using "one" however in both the French and German 
language: "on croit" and "man glaubt". The English 
use of "one" is also acceptable. While Macquarrie & 
Robinson discuss this in detail on pg. 149 of Being 
and Time, they decide to use "they" in place of "one". 
I will use "Das Man" and leave it untranslated or 
"one". 
41. Being and Time, pg. 149-150 
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Chapter II 
Ordinary Speaking: The In-Authentic Mode of Communication 
Even to cite speaking as "ordinary" at all implies a 
contrast; that there is another kind of speaking that is differ-
ent. It also implies that some distance has been gained from 
Daseinfs immersion in such speaking and that Dasein is capable 
of a growing awareness that can understand ordinary speaking for 
what it is* Wisdom for Plato was seeing the shadow as shadow. 
There is no doubt that it is a long and arduous journey from out 
of the darkened cave into the sunlight. It is an equally diffi-
cult journey for Dasein to gain distance from everyday speaking 
since its immersion in this speaking leaves little room for 
thought or critical perspective. From within this mode of 
speaking, in which Dasein lives out its life for the most part, 
everything is tranquil. Speech is already established and all 
Dasein need do is go along; this it does functioning quite well 
within ordinary speech until it becomes aware of another possi-
bility, i.e., extraordinary speaking; until it faces its 
finitude through anxiety and the call to conscience. 
1. The Republic, Book VIII 
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In uncovering the structure of Daseinfs awareness of this 
speaking as ordinary, we might impose three constituent aspects 
as an arbitrary means of bringing this growth to light. There-
fore this chapter will emphasize the various degrees of awareness 
in each aspect through which Dasein gradually moves; due to its 
thrownness, it becomes dispersed in publicness to the degree it 
fails to hear or allow the ontological realm to make itself mani-
fest. Dasein is first caught up in everyday speaking and can say 
little if anything about it, for Dasein has no point from which to 
take a stand. This does not mean, however, that this dispersal is 
or can ever be total, leaving Dasein in the dark, completely cut 
off from the possibility of gaining some distance from it. It 
can gain this distance to the degree that it is not distracted 
by entities in the world. Secondly, the lessening of this fas-
cination with entities if brought about through anxiety* which 
although in the background of ordinary speaking, makes it poss-
ible for Dasein to gain distance from everyday speaking, as it 
In order to avoid a misunderstanding, it seems appropriate 
to remind the reader that "...anxiety.,.belongs to existence 
as such and not to an abnormal state of mind as in neurotic 
(and psychotic) anxiety... ." The Courage To Be, pg. 41. 
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brings Dasein face to face with its finitude. Finally, the 
dissatisfaction Dasein experiences due to anxiety brings it to 
a turning point, a cross-road where It faces two possibilities: 
it can either flee being toward death by fleeing toward the 
world and absorbing itself in the world even more deeply than 
before to avoid its nothingness or—it can relate authentically 
to its mortality. Anxiety affords Dasein the possibility of 
obtaining a standpoint and allows it to recognize in-authentic 
speaking for what it is and only then will Dasein be able to 
turn its attention to an alternative mode of communication. 
In inquiring into the way these aspects are manifested in 
Dasein1s ordinary speaking, we must come to grips with the 
following questions: Just what is our ordinary way of listening 
and speaking? Who is the listener or speaker? What does such 
speaking speak about? Who is spoken to? Is this speakir^ g in 
any way deficient? If so, how and why? What is Heidegger's 
alternative? 
That speaking which Dasein engages in from day to day is 
called "ordinary" or "everyday" speaking. Neither of these terms 
is to be taken in a pejorative sense, that is, they do not imply 
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that Dasein has "less being or a lower degree of being" when 
speaking in this mode. These terms do mean that when we ask, 
"How do we find Daseinfs speaking of speech 'proximally and for 
the most part'"?, we mean to do nothing other than to inquire 
into the way Dasein manifests itself "usually but not always" 
as being in the world with other beings [Mit-Sein] in a public 
3 
manner. 
It is in this public manner, that Dasein comes 'face to 
face1 with the possibility of its being [Mit-Dasein] in its 
everyday inter-human relationships. Dasein finds itself an 
entity amid the other Daseins it wanders among, becoming fas-
cinated by its ability to manipulate and use them. In its 
wanderings, it becomes lost in its effort to satisfy its desires 
which are given it by "Das Man"f* It turns first to this entity 
2. Being and Time, pg. 68 
3. ibid, pg. 42 
"What we have in mind in the expression of "everydayness" 
is a definite "how" of existence by which Dasein is domina-
ted through and through for life. ... Proximately1 signifies 
the way in which Dasein shows itself for Everyman, not 
always, 'but as a rule'". 
"Das Man" and "One" are the same. See * Chapter 1, pg. 34. 
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for satisfaction and then to another, exhausting each in turn 
superficially, looking for that which will give meaning to its 
life. Dasein seldom thinks to question or extend its search to 
that which grounds these entities: Being. As long as it mistakes 
the ontic level for the whole of reality, it will continue to be 
frustrated in its search. 
Most of the time it is content to drift along on the ontic 
level on which in functions in its day to day living: 
«, • .Everydayness is determinative for Dasein even 
when it has not chosen "Das Man" for its hero... • 
Everydayness is a way to be—...to which of course, 
that which is publically manifest belongs. 
Because of the tranquillity* it feels on this level it forgets 
or ignores an alternative level on which its ontological task lies. 
4. ibid, pg. 422 
* Tranquillization comes about ".•.when Dasein, tranquillized 
and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with 
everything, it drifts toward an alienation in which.*.(its 
ontological task is hidden from it). Dispersed Being-in-the-
world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the 
same time alienating". ("Dispersed" is substituted for 
"Falling" [Verfalien] because it is less subject to mis-
understanding and is also more accurately descriptive of 
Dasein's state of being lost in publicness.) (ibid, pg. 222). 
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Dasein by-passes the ontological level by saying, "It will not 
put bread on the table, build bridges or pay the mortgage". 
Dasein immerses itself in the world of busyness, the world of 
production and technology in which it loses itself to the values 
that have been imposed upon it as "One" of many. Paradoxically, 
Dasein claims or insists that this publicness is the whole of 
reality. 
In mistaking part of reality for its whole, Dasein makes 
three subsequent errors: When it is asked, "Who listens or 
speaks"?, it says, "I do", in the erroneous assumption that 
the "I" who answers, the "I who is One among many" is myself, 
the autonomous or individual Self [Selbstandig] of Daseinfs 
5. Heidegger-Through Phenomenology to Thought. 
"The phenomenological analysis of everydayness is not 
concerned, of course, with describing how a man uses his 
knife and fork but how underneath all commerce, There-
being and other beings, there lies the coming to pass of 
transcendence." Transcendence means here passing from 
being Mit-Sein to being Mit-Dasein, i.e., the primacy 
of Dasein over other entities is that among all entities 
it alone has its very being as its task. (pg. 35-36) 
41. 
f% 
being, when in fact it is not myself, the "not-I" , the 
["Un-selbstandigkeit"] that listens or speaks instead. The 
concern of everyday listening or speaking is "Idle talk, gossip 
and hear-say"*, which it mistakes in all seriousness as its 
proper interest. Those to whom Dasein speaks are notably ab-
sent as other Selves, for Dasein directs its speaking to 
everyone and no one in particular. It listens to and speaks 
/ 
with others who are but many inter-changeable "ones". Thus it 
6. Being and Time, pg. 152 
"The word fIf is to be understood only in the sense of a 
non-committal formal indicator, indicating something which 
may perhaps reveal itself as its 'opposite' in some 
particular phenomenal context of being. In that case, 
the fnot-If is by no means tantamount to an entity which 
essentially lacks fI-hoodf "Ichheit", but is rather a 
definite kind of being which the rIf itself possesses, 
such as having lost itself [Selbstverlorenheit]". 
"....mere hearing scatters and defuses itself in what is 
commonly believed and said, in hearsay, in doxa, appearance, 
...The man who is not a follower (Parmenides refers here 
to authentic listening in which the "collectedness of the 
essent itself is followed) is excluded from the logos 
from the start. Those who merely hear by listening 
around and assembling rumors remain the [axynetoi], the 
uncomprehending. ..." gntro_duction to Metaphysics, 
pg* 109.) 
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is, that in ordinary listening and speaking, Dasein almost 
always passes by the possibility for becoming Itself. 
Dasein clings to the ontic level by concealing that of the 
ontological level. The everyday speaking in which Dasein mani-
fests itself temporally is in un-truth which it takes to be its 
truth. It seems to the "One" that truth belongs to man rather 
than being. Dasein's insistence that entities be up-rooted from 
their ontological ground in the publicness of speaking does not 
do away with that ground, i.e., the ground is always given with 
the entity whether Dasein apprehends this entity in its totality 
or not. That this ground is given makes it possible for Dasein 
to apprehend an entity ontically; it provides a network of 
meaning from which the entity can be abstracted. To be more 
specific: in its everyday speaking, Dasein pays attention or 
listens to what is said as such. What is shown or pointed out 
in this speaking (and in every ordinary speaking for that 
matter), is being toward an entity in a manner that reveals it 
only partially. What is not shown is being toward an entity in 
its totality; it is this that is covered over, heard out of 
context. This in turn leads to a response that also disregards 
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the context; what is spoken about, e.g., the tree, the rock, or 
the person, is being spoken about as already established; it is 
confined to being as having been and is thus cut off from future 
possibilities to preserve it temporally.* From listening to 
speaking then, ordinary speech orients itself in the past which 
it also takes to be its future and which it makes present in a 
series of on-going "nows", revealing Dasein as temporally con-
fined to the past in a fixed manner. Due to the way Dasein 
temporalizes itself through its mis-relation to the three 
aspects of time, Dasein stretches itself along a linear plane 
dis-regarding the ecstatic temporality in favor of one aspect 
of it, and, being in un-truth, it is therefore un-free. 
This overview affords us a look at the general structure 
of everyday speaking, but it has not revealed a clear picture 
of the growth of Daseinfs awareness. We should turn now to 
look at everyday listening and speaking in detail, so that 
this growth can be followed as Dasein variously experiences it 
While this preservation lends continuity to speech and 
thought, the main purpose here is Dasein's attempt to 
keep things as they were "making present" its past in 
an infinite series of f*nows" in a bid for immortality; 
it is an attempted denial of finitude. This will 
become more clear by the end of this chapter. 
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in its three constituent aspects, coming to grips with the 
limitations along its way toward taking up its task—the 
meaning of its existence. 
Our ordinary way of listening and speaking is a public 
one7—it is the world of "Das Man". Dasein as "Das Man" has its 
initial sense of self given to it by everyone, but this fact 
goes unrecognized until Dasein gradually becomes aware of itself 
as "One" as it comes up against the limits of ordinary speech 
and can see this speech for what it is. Dasein finds itself 
thrown into an already existent way of speaking in which words 
flow forth in the service of convention. Conventional listening 
and speaking, listening and speaking in our usual manner which 
includes the usual content and form, is what we mean 'proximally 
and for the most part' by communication. From the time we begin 
speaking as young children, "Das Man" has already taken over; 
at the first manifestations of crying out as a baby to the last 
breath of old age, we are given to understand there is an appro-
priate way to think and feel. These thoughts and feelings must 
conform to those of "One". This conformity, nameless and 
...^-u^,,,.,., n^ ,.,, „„j ,., .,mjl.m .,„„,, a,t.. „ , ,,„,m.,w„mM,.,mm^, „,„„.,, „,,,. , „.„»tJJ,l, 
7. ibid, pg. 165 
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faceless as it is, imposes itself throughout its very existence. 
This imposition is never sudden nor in the open where Dasein 
can confront it, rather it lies hidden from sight. "One" says 
or does this or that in a traditional way but if Dasein were to 
ask "who" is the "One" who decrees thus and so, there would be 
no answer because it is no-one in particular. 
The dictatorship of "Das Man" begins in the way Dasein 
listens. The way Dasein listens determines the degree it will 
become immersed in everydayness; to the degree that listening 
refuses to admit and restore the ontological ground of speaking 
to speech, for example, if it hears only faintly, the more deeply 
Dasein becomes fascinated by and absorbed in the world. On the 
other hand, the more willingly Dasein gives up its insistence 
in denying this significant totality by listening more attentive-
ly, the more distinctly it will hear "the call of conscience"8 
and the less the world of One will hold sway over it. 
8. The foundation has not been laid for introducing this term 
but it is too early yet to make such an introduction 
although its use is appropriate here. It is discussed 
later in this chapter on page 65 and in detail in the next 
chapter beginning on page B&« 
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That "Das Man" 'understands1 the importance of listening 
should come as little surprise, since it has made a mode of 
listening the concern of publicness, much to the delight of 
businesses which find it both a marketable product (books, 
articles, and educational programming) as well as a useful 
tool (management personnel are given courses to learn how to 
flisten" to their workers, concentrating on picking up key 
words which can be used to persuade the worker himself that 
he is really cared about). Learning how to listen has come to 
be recognized as a major problem in everyday communication. 
Bookstore shelves display the latest "bestsellers" which are 
willing to unlock the secrets of communication for the price of 
the book. Magazines publish article after article about 
children whose parents won't listen to them; about parents who 
accuse their off-spring of "tuning them out and turning them 
off"; and about husbands and wives whose marriages end in 
divorce, giving the reason as incompatibility—a polite 
euphemism many times for the failure to listen to one-another. 
What happens then in our everyday listening that brings about 
this frustrating state of affairs? 
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"Das Man's" concern with listening and its proposed remedies 
are of little avail since the problem arises in the first place 
because Dasein listens as "One" listens; it listens, in passing, 
to what is said. This listening is characterized by listening 
in an average way that maintains itself in an attitude of in-
difference. Dasein hears what it has always heard just as it 
has always heard it, even if what Dasein hears appears new to 
it; it still listens in the same way that abstracts the entity 
talked about from its referential totality. 
Inauthentic listening is characterized by a distorted 
temporal ecstasis which regulates itself according to an infinite 
series of 'nows' by retaining what it hears as having been heard. 
What of the future? There too listening imposes its past on the 
"not yet" by pushing it ahead of itself so that the "not-yet-now" 
is, as having been. Nietzsche so aptly characterized this 
temporal ecstasis as man's "...ill will against time and its 
9 
'it was1". Listening mis-relates to all three aspects of the 
9. Thus Spake Zarathustra, pg. 252. 
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moment! The past is fixed, the present is an infinite series 
of "nows" continuing the fixedness of the past. The future is 
in reality denied since it is sealed off from the possibility 
of a new context.* Openness toward the future which comes 
toward Dasein is obscured. All that is heard is the entity 
abstracted from the ground and passed along. The network of 
meaning in which entities refer to one another is ignored. The 
foundation for listening then is a reliance on the past in which: 
inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself 
as an awaiting which makes present [gegenwartigendes 
Ge*wartigen] —an awaiting to whose ecstatical 
unity there must belong a corresponding 'having 
been'.10 
Dasein assumes that what it hears will be as it always was and 
so it picks up a word or phrase here and there, but in spite of 
the "attention" it pays, it still maintains a disinterested 
The subject of inauthentic temporality is by no means 
dealt with ±n a complete manner, yet to do so here would 
place us ahead of ourselves without a firm foundation to 
build upon as we have not introduced the possibility of 
anxiety or the way being towards death shapes our flight 
toward infinity through our ordinary understanding of 
'time1. 
10. Being, & Time, pg. 388. 
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attitude. It is not a matter of WHAT is said, for all content 
of everyday speaking is heard in the same manner; nor does it 
matter that this "One" speaks rather than that "One". We hear 
what we are expected to hear and in the way that is appropriate 
to "One". Dasein hears what "One" says and responds in its 
speaking by way of speculating and passing along what it has 
heard. The obligation Dasein might have to understand, to seek 
the truth, is dispensed with. Dasein is released from the 
responsibility of making what is said its own, because in 
listening it has only heard what "One" hears as "One" hears. 
It need not think through, consider or reflect—all that is 
required is a kind of mindless acceptance of what is decreed 
by "Das Man". 
The mindless acceptance that characterizes listening, makes 
itself manifest in Dasein's speaking with one another as "Idle 
talk": 
Idle talk is the possibility of understanding 
everything without previously making the thing 
one's own.11 
11. Being and Time, pg. 213 
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Dasein hears and understands what is said in "idle talk" only 
"approximately and superficially. We have the same things in 
view because it is in the same averageness that we have a 
common understanding of what is said."!^ In "idle talk" we 
abstract from the given situation so that words reveal what has 
been the case in similar situations; we "level" all situations 
into being as that one once was. Our greetings, endearments, 
questions and assertions are said as "One" would say them. Their 
significance is measured in its measurelessness; that is, in 
confining these entities to their past, to being as having been, 
Dasein relates to them repetitiously. Everything is equally 
important and equally un-important. In its habitual understand-
ing of entities, Dasein says, "It's raining today.", "How are 
you"?, "I love you"., valuing the content of speech indiscrimin-
ately; in such speaking, all content is interchangeable and 
distanceless. 
It is because there is no particular "One" to be singled 
out in the anonymity of publicness that Dasein feels helpless 
and is at the disposal of "Das Man", Yet it is Daseinfs 
going along with this publicness and covering over its going 
12. ibid, pg. 212 
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along that makes "Das Man" all the more powerful. It seems 
strange that Dasein belongs to "Das Man" both in its ("Das 
Man's") imposition and in Dasein*s going^along yet Dasein 
does not realize its own involvement. 
This lack of awareness on Daseinfs part will seem more 
plausible if we understand the three reasons that hide and 
distort Dasein!s perspective! First, the listener or speaker 
is no particular "One", but rather, it is "One" of many; 
Second, the content of Dasein's listening and speaking,that 
about which it listens and speaks, is given to it by "Das Man"; 
and last, those to whom it speaks are like itself, part of the 
anonymous crowds 
'The Others' whom one thus designates in order 
to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them 
essentially oneself...'are there' in everyday 
being with one-another. The 'who' is not this 
one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], 
not some people [einige] and not the sum of 
them all. ...13 
Still, there is the danger that our speaking thus reduces 
"Das Man" to an abstract entity--something vaporous. It must 
13. ibid, pg. 164 
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be made perfectly clear that in his everydayness, Dasein is 
"Das Man11! one-self iDas Man-Selbst]; that is, Dasein is given 
to itself in terms of being an impersonal "One". This under-
standing extends to the way it 'sees' itself as subject! 
Proximally, it is not fI f, in the sense of my own 
Self that 'am1 but rather the Others, whose way 
is that of "Das Man"* In terms of the "One" and 
as the "One", I am 'given1 proximally, Dasein is 
"One", and for the most part remains so.l^ " 
Dasein understands itself as and is closest to the "Self" given 
to it by "Das Man". Dasein disperses itself among its myriad 
of ways to be and is "driven about by them" because of its 
absorption in the world. Due to this fragmentation, Dasein 
covers over the question of being itself and 'lives up1 to 
its various ways to be as "One11! 
Dasein's facticity is such that its being-in-the-
world has always dispersed Izerstreut] itself or 
even split itself up into definite ways of being 
in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by 
the following examples; having to do with 
something, producing something, attending to 
something, giving something up and letting it 
go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
14. ibid, pg. 167 
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interrogating, considering, discussing, determining... 
All these ways of being-in have concern* as their 
kind of being.**15 
Dasein encounters the world as 'present at hand'; so too, it 
attempts to understand itself the same way, " it understands its 
"not-I" as its "I" and holds on to this understanding tenaciously. 
It tries to make itself into a thing but it can NEVER totally 
succeed because there is always the possibility of recovery, that 
is, Dasein can at any point retrieve itself from this dispersal 
in the world. This attempt to understand itself as 'present at 
* The German word, "'Besorgen' stands rather for the kind of 
'concern' in which we 'concern ourselves1 with activities 
which we perform or things we procure." (Being and Time, 
pg. 83, Pt.N. 1.) It is "the kind of dealing which is 
closest to us,..not a bare perceptual cognition, but 
rather that kind of concern which manipulates things 
and puts them to use;...". 
15. ibid, pg. 83 
16. ibid, pg.68 
"...Dasein does not have the kind of being which belongs 
to something present at hand within the world, nor does 
it everhave it." Understanding itself thus is a mistake 
on Dasein's part® The reason for this manner of going 
astray will be taken up in the Conclusion. 
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hand' is the result of Daseinfs flight in the face of the 
possibility of its Self-realization, that is, it flees the 
realization that it will no longer be; that its being is being 
towards death. It endeavors to achieve its endurance through 
the on-going conventional and traditional "self" supplied by 
Others, It therefore fosters this vacuousness by allowing 
itself to be determined by everyone; what Dasein says is decided 
by what Others will think of it'—how they will judge it. Its 
thoughts and feelings are regulated in an acceptable manner to 
please everyone but it thinks it is pleasing its Self. Dasein 
takes itself as it finds itself, but moreover, it takes this part 
to be the whole'—and so "it misses itself and covers itself up". 
Dasein asks the questions that "Das Man" asks; makes asser-
tions and interpretations that "One" makes. There is nothing to 
distinguish the listening or speaking of this Dasein from that 
of any other Dasein; for Dasein becomes more and more anonymous— 
lost in the "One" as it flees choosing its Self! 
17. ibid, pg. 168 
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This being with one another dissolves one's own 
Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the 
Others', in such a way, indeed that the Others 
as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and 
more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertain-
ability, the real dictatorship of the "One" is 
unfolded.18 
The dissolution of Dasein into "Das Man" begins as speech is 
learned and makes in-roads as socialization is pressed upon it. 
Values are assigned and any deviation from the norm brings quick 
censure, while acceptance of such an imposition brings public ac-
claim. Nowhere is this more strikingly noted than in the Platonic 
Dialogue, "The Apology", in which Socrates, in questioning the 
accepted meaning of speech agreed upon by a consensus of public 
opinion, shows the conceit* of everyday speaking, thus bringing 
public disapproval to bear on his activities. Afraid of losing its 
hold on Dasein by having its complacency disturbed, "Das Man" goes 
18. ibid, pg. 164 
* The "conceit" referred to in this dialogue is the hubris 
of public opinion in its claim that human wisdom is un-
limited; that it is the whole of reality rather than a 
part. In everyday speaking this un-deserved claim to 
truth is insisted on by "Everyman". See 22d & e and 23 e., 
Collected Dialogues, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Carins. 
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to great lengths to maintain its position. The lengths it goes to 
are in direct proportion to the threat it feels; for Socrates, the 
choice offered was cessation of questioning, exile or death. 
Even where rebellion from the standards decreed by publicness 
(here we are not including Socrates) exists, it does so 'for the 
most part' in a public manner, i.e., if one must "swim against the 
tide", the ways disapproval can be expressed are also dictated by 
"Das Man". What perhaps began as an original questioning of 
publicness runs the risk of being popularized, of being taken over 
by "Das Man" and rendered harmless by being made a "fad", a socially 
acceptable game to be indulged in but not taken seriously except 
as "One" is serious. 
The cry against the dehumanization of technocracy, and the 
need to re-think priorities in our everyday dealings with one-
another, as exemplified by the "Flower Children" of the 1960's, 
were instances of this process. These movements soon became 
meaningless as publicness countered the threat to its authority 
by making them "the thing to do" and by reducing attempted "original" 
speaking to jargon and slogans. It then turned these slogans against 
the spirit of such speaking in a mocking manner without any attempt 
to listen or uncover the truth in such speaking; e.g., the fact that 
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"flower power" and "spaceship earth" were efforts to recall us to 
an open caring for each other and our environment, were laughed at; 
while "getting it together" (pointing toward a bid for individuation) 
and "different strokes for different folks" (pointing toward 
acceptance of differences between individuals) were seen to be 
anarchy. 
In order to hinder, discourage or stop potential "original" 
speech and preserve Dasein as "One", "Das Man" banalizes such speaking 
by making it familiar and drawing it into everyday speech, speeding 
its degeneration. There, in everyday speech, "original" speech is 
dispersed until this speaking becomes common; some activity to be 
taken up in the manner one takes up this or that and becomes immersed 
in it. For example, "flower power" is publicized by setting it to a 
catchy jingle and using it to improve the florist business or sell 
fertilizer for plants. Such publicizing need not be so blatant, 
however, since politics, business and religion—or just "getting 
ahead" can concern "one" in the same way. 
Dasein's reluctance to disturb conventional speech, emotions 
and thoughts, i.e., to resist the dictatorship of the many by risking 
the comfortable anonymity that being lost in publicness affords, is 
due to the difficulty of reaching past the "self" given to it by 
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"Das Man". Having been soothed by the assurances of everyone that 
its familiarity with entities in idle talk is evidence that it 
understands everything about the world and itself, Dasein Gan 
easily believe there is no need to question that publicness can 
provide it with the meaning of existence. 
In this placid state, Dasein floats unattached in its speaking, 
repeating what "one" has heard without question. Engaging in the 
mindless babble of everyday speaking that "measures out life with 
coffee spoons" by concerning itself with superficial questions such 
19 
as! "Shall I part my hair behind? Do I dare to eat a peach?" , 
Dasein is alienated from "...its ownmost potentiality for being... . 
Dasein exhibits this alienation (although it is for the most part 
unaware of it as such) in the following examples of estrangement in 
ordinary speaking! by referring to itself in the third person as 
one; "One is forced to do these things.", "One says or does thus 
and so"; in the first person plural, Dasein attempts to shed its 
identity as its "own" in "We are all only human", or in refusing 
responsibility, Dasein uses the neuter—"It couldn't be helped." 
19. TJ5. Eliot, The Complete PoemsandPlays, from "The Love Song 
of J. Alfred Profrock", pg. 7. 
20. Being and Time, pg. 232 
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This lack of appropriation in Dasein's everyday speaking, in the 
sense of "failing" to make my own, is hidden from view due to the 
tranquillity fostered by publicness. At the same time, this 
tranquillity is undercut by a vague un-easiness which Dasein can't 
single out, but which is there none the less, when the emptiness 
of its speaking becomes fleetingly apparent. It is supposed to 
understand itself according to what it has been led to believe by 
Others, after all it has been made quite clear that every "one" 
has this understanding; yet Dasein is not at all sure just what it 
understands, just what its relation to its world is in its speaking. 
It is assailed by the nagging possibility that perhaps it has been 
led astray in its speaking in going along with "Das Man's" imposition, 
although this realization may be only an indefinite suspicion. 
What then is to bring Dasein to the point where it can free 
itself to some degree from its dispersal in everyday speaking where 
it can understand itself and its world? "Das Man" cannot take 
Dasein over completely, nor at the same time can Dasein "go along" 
in such a manner as to be entirely lost in the publicness of idle 
talk, because it can never fully dis-own itself. If it were possible 
for Dasein to immerse itself in the world completely, it would be 
without possibility—it would be determined and unfree, totally in 
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the dark. How can Dasein be brought out of the partial dark-
ness and into the light? In terms of the three constituent 
aspects already arbitrarily distinguished, how can Dasein achieve 
its growth through the aspect of its preoccupation with entities 
in everyday speaking to encompass that aspect which can be 
characterized as a diminishing involvement with others brought 
about by anxiety? How is it to free itself to some degree of 
the imposition of "Das Man" and choose itself, thus becoming 
individualized? In other words, how is Dasein to appropriate 
or reach as its own its "unique openness to being" . 
Dasein believes it could understand itself in terms of 
its world and being with others, but anxiety deprives it of 
its "at-homeness" in the dispersal of the publicness of everyday 
speaking by disclosing the world as world, thus disrupting 
Daseinfs complacency. The grip Dasein seems to have on the 
"fixedness" of the past made present, (for example! the use 
of the qualifying terms in its speaking such as "continually", 
"ever", "forever", and "always"), seems to crumble before 
it as Dasein is called upon to cast its decision to be its 
Self in its speaking. The anxiety Dasein feels in various 
21. Heidegger and The Path Of Thinking, from the essay, "On 
The Way To Being", pg. 13. 
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situations* which involve the meaning of its life, such as a new 
job, marriage, puberty, old age; those situations in which Dasein 
is thrown back upon its Self and is faced with the question, "Who 
am I"?, in any of its various forms, lessen Dasein?s preoccupation 
with entities. New situations supply a eontext in which the old 
formulations of speaking aren't adequate. The discomfort brought 
on by this inadequacy leads Dasein to cover over the newness of a 
situation by dealing with it in terms of an old way of responding. 
One way of doing this is in terms of stereotypes of inauthentic 
speaking which down-grades life, e.g., referring to government as 
"...Immediately seen, anxiety is the painful feeling of not 
being able to deal with the threat of a special situation. 
But a more exact analysis shows that in the anxiety about 
any special situation anxiety about the human situation 
as such is implied* It is the anxiety of not being able to 
preserve one's own being which underlies every fear and is 
the frightening element in it. In the moment, therefore, in 
which "naked anxiety" lays hold of the mind, the previous 
objects of fear cease to be definite objects. They appear 
as what they always were In part, symptoms of man's basic 
anxiety. As such they are beyond the reach of even the 
most courageous attack upon them. .*.The basic anxiety, 
the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of non-
being ^  cannot be eliminated. It belongs to existence 
itself. ..." (The Courage To Be, pg* 38) 
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the "establishment"; marriage, as "the ball and chain gang"; the 
young, as "the Pepsi generation" and the elderly, as the "over the 
hill gang11! 
...Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility 
of understanding itself as it disperses in terms of the 
world and the way things have been publically interpreted. 
Anxiety throws Dasein back on that which it is anxious 
about—its authentic potentiality for being in the world. 
Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-
the-world, which as something that understands, projects 
itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore... 
anxiety discloses Dasein as being-possible. ...22 
As Dasein rushes from this to that, entangled in its ontic 
projects? its frenzy of activity cannot completely hide the 
uncanniness that pursues it even in the midst of the tranquillity 
of everyday speaking. Even in those moments when it is certain of 
its mastery over the worlds when it is content and happy, Dasein is 
still assailed by uneasiness. It is not this or that entity that 
makes Dasein uneasy; it does not turn away from entities within the 
world, on the contrary, it flees toward them; but in so doing, it 
flees its own being in the world. Dasein surrounds itself with the 
continuous chatter of radio or television because it is uncomfortable 
with solitude and has need of noise to distract itself—to pull its 
22. Being and Time, pg. 232 
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attention away from serious consideration of where it is coming 
from and where it is going* Daseinfs flight discloses the "there" 
from which it flees as flight from its authentic possibilities; 
it turns away from becoming its Self, and flees its thrownness, 
its being-in-the-world. More specifically9 Dasein flees its 
thrownness toward death. 
Just as the designation of one mode of speaking as "everyday" 
implied it to be contrasted with another kind of speaking as 
extra-ordinary, so too the comfort Dasein feels in being "one" 
of many in everyday speaking implies discomfort or the feeling of 
not being at home (uncanny) as an authentic potentiality for 
being its Self: 
...When in dispersal we flee into the "at-home" of 
publicness, we flee in the face of the nnot-at-home"; 
that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which 
lies in Dasein—in Dasein as thrown being-in-the-
world, which has been delivered over to itself in 
its being. This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, 
and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "One", 
though not explicitly. This threat can go together 
factically with complete assurance and self-sufficiency 
in onefs everyday concern.23 
23. ibid, pg. 234 
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Although anxiety is a "constant...threat..." to Daseinfs 
dispersal in the publicness of everyday speaking, it is not an 
obvious one. Because anxiety remains in the background of ordinary 
speaking for the most part, moving to the foreground only rarely, 
"...It (anxiety) is to be understood as an extreme possibility 
("aussersteMoglichkeit) and as such cannot be necessary (nicht 
notwendig)." "One" dismisses anxiety and mistakenly concludes 
therefore that it itself is not anxious! 
And only because anxiety is always latent (rather 
than manifest) in being-in-the-world, can such 
being-in-the-world, ever be afraid. Fear is 
anxiety, dispersed into the fworldf, inauthentic, 
and as such hidden from itself. 
After all, the mood of uncanniness remains, 
factically, something for which we mostly have no 
existentiell understanding. Moreover, under the 
ascendancy of dispersal and publicness, ?realf 
anxiety is rare. ... 
It is not clear to Dasein that the uneasiness it feels in 
crisis situations (be they happy occasions where "one" is reluctant 
to look too hard at its happiness and says, "Don!t tempt fateJ It 
(happiness)won11 last.", or on sad occasions says, "Thatfs life"!), 
24. Heidegger and The Path To Thinking, from the essay, "On The 
Way To Being", pg. 13 
25. Being and Time, pg. 234 
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which throw it against its own resources, is at its base an 
ontological one. Dasein is constantly "called"2" to take up its 
task, that is, it is invited into the "openness" of being. This 
vague uneasiness is "nothing" Dasein can "put its finger on" by 
clearly singling out what oppresses it. What oppresses it is the 
fact that it has forgotten the wholeness that is appropriate to it. 
Those who claim they are not anxious often cover over their anxiety 
by not attending to it. To the degree that Dasein turns toward or 
is open to being; to the degree that it willingly listens, the more 
it readily confronts its anxiety, trying to take hold of it, the 
more clearly anxiety assumes a central role of concern. Yet Dasein 
can never leave dispersal in everyday speaking behind completely— 
so anxiety can never be perfectly and completely grasped by Dasein 
no matter how willingly or attentively it listens. The more 
inauthentically Dasein listens, the less willing it is to come to 
terms with anxiety, the less it is AWARE that it is anxious, because 
it covers over the ontological roots of anxiety and attributes any 
26. "...It (conscience) is a call to the discovery, by a Self that 
is thrown into the world, of its own real possibilities in 
their death-directed reality. Conscience is the silence of 
my being before the call of its own situation. The Meaning 
of Heidegger, pg. 35. 
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anxiety however vague to this or that in the situation. Dasein 
rarely grasps the ontological implications of anxiety because 
it forgets the ontological dimension by closing itself off from 
it as it attempts to flee its mortality. 
The role of anxiety is to bring Dasein to the turning point 
where it must decide the way it will temporally relate to its being 
toward death. Dasein must come to grips with its nothingness in 
answer to the "call of conscience", i.e., awareness by Dasein 
itself that it is -iAn Ek-sistent whose possibilities begin in the 
darkness of the Geworfenheit ("thrownness") and end in the certi-
tude of death, can never in its Da be far from a realization of 
27 its nothingness (Nichtigkeit)•" Dasein can °ither cover over 
its being toward death by flight into dispersal or it can relate 
to death authentically as its ownmost possibility. The discussion 
of the third of the constituent aspects of the growth of Dasein1s 
awareness will center on the way Daseinfs inauthentic relation to 
death is manifested in everyday speaking; but at the same time, 
comment on an alternative mode of speaking, extra-ordinary 
speaking, which relates to death as its own possibility, will 
be reserved for the next chapter. 
27. TheMeaning of Heidegger, pg. 35 
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As anxiety frees Dasein to some degree from its fascination 
with entities within the world, it also loosens the way Dasein 
manifests itself temporally as its awareness of itself, as being 
toward death, takes hold. When Dasein inauthentically grasps death 
as a final point at which projection into the future must be 
abandoned, the point at which possibilities cease, death becomes 
that possibility which is to be eluded as its "ownmost" possibility. 
To this end, Dasein's ordinary response is the attempt to flee the 
realization of death as its own by dispersing itself in everyday 
speaking. This dispersal allows Dasein to impersonalize its response 
to death as its own and relate to its mortality in the manner of "One". 
Just as it was pointed out above that "Das Man" dictated the 
ways disapproval of the standards of publicness could be expressed, 
so here too, "Das Man" regulates the manner in which Dasein as "One" 
is to behave toward death. In public talk, death is separated from 
life as an unfortunate event which befalls others but has little to 
do with Dasein in its day to day living. lfWhen my time comes...", 
Dasein says, rushing to turn aside any contemplation of death as a 
possibility at all, but treats it rather as something actual at some 
unknown point--certainly not something to be contended with at the 
moment since "One" concentrates on life and "One's" involvement with 
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it. Taking death as being at an end, Dasein, in its horror at 
contemplating what it takes to be the event of its nothingness, 
can go to ridiculous lengths to hide its anxiety over death. Goethe, 
for instance 
...refused to hear of the death of friends and hid 
himself from the view of passing funeral processions. 
In addition, he forbade mention of death in his 
presence and tried to cut death out of his existence. 
Another way inauthentic Dasein expresses its latent anxiety is 
through "black" humor (humor about death or dying in which the tragic 
is made fun of to mask the pain Dasein feels) which makes light of 
any seriousness with which Dasein might approach death in an attempt" 
to relieve the sharpness of the anguish it feels over its finitude 
with such expressions that refer to death as "Kicking the bucket", 
or "Pushing up^the daisies". 
Publicness attempts to cover over or make light of Daseinfs 
thrownness by reassuring it (Dasein) that it is morbid to pay the 
slightest attention to death* except as "One" dies, but paradoxically, 
"One" does not die; "One" passes on, sleeps, or is at rest. An 
28. Living Your Dying, pg. 5 
* For example, it is considered a distasteful breech of 
convention to make death the topic of conversation at a 
cocktail party or in casual talking. 
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elaborate Cosmetology"industry which is an off-shoot of the mortuary 
business, has as its task^ the problem of making corpses look like 
they are not dead at all, but asleep, and that any second they will 
wake, sit up and climb out of the casket to join the mourners. Not 
only is death hidden beneath the artifices of make-up, but the ravages 
of life as well are glossed over; Dasein tries to deny the change over 
from one kind of being to another; "from an entity with Daseinfs kind 
29 
of being to no-longer Dasein". In this manner, "Das Man" hopes to 
soothe and tranquillize Dasein1s uneasiness about death so that it 
will forget that death is 'non-relational and not to be outstripped";* 
This evasive concealment in the face of death 
dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in 
being with one another, the 'neighbors' often 
still keep talking the 'dying person1 into the 
belief that he will escape death and soon return 
to the tranquillized everydayness of the world 
of his concern. Such 'solicitude' is meant to 
console him. It insists on bringing him back 
into Dasein, while in addition it helps him to 
29. Being and Time, pg. 281 
* The first term "...indicates that in death Dasein is cut off 
from relations with others. The term has accordingly been 
translated as 'non— relational'^  in the sense of 'devoid of 
relationships'." (ibid, pg. 294) The second term refers to 
the fact that Dasein "As potentiality for being...cannot 
outstrip the possibility for death. Death is the possibility 
of the absolute impossibility of Dasein." (ibid) 
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keep his ownmost non-relational possibility-of-
being completely concealed. In this manner the 
"One" provides constant tratKjui111zation about 
d^ gath. At bottom however, tfiis is a tranquilli-
^atxon not only for him who is 'dying' but just 
as much for those who console him. ...30 
Being toward death as "One" turns out to be flight in the face 
of death. "Das Man" tries to divert Dasein's attention from taking 
its death seriously, by making death a continuation of life, e.g., 
speaking of death as sleeping and resting and the cosmetic prepara-
tion of the corpse | but these practices result instead in a 
tending toward flight from life by making it death-like. This is 
seen in Dasein's endeavor to temporalize itself inauthentically 
by closing itself off from an open future in which it is its "not-
yet", that is, it does not appropriate or make the possibility of 
its nothingness its own. To avoid this appropriation, it temporalizes 
itself inauthentically by "...temporalizing an infinite time out of 
31 the finite". We have already mentioned the use of the temporally 
qualifying terms such as "continually", "ever", "forever", and 
"always" above on page 60 (and we might also include the negative 
"never" with these) to show the way Dasein's speaking reflects the 
30. ibid, pg. 297 
31. ibid, pg. 379 
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"fixedness" of the past made present. It seems especially 
appropriate here to remind ourselves that the reason Dasein 
attempts to rigidify its speaking by using absolutes is that it 
attempts to flee its finitude by negating it—by making what is 
s 
finite, infinite. In fact Dasein expresses its "ill will against * 
time" by referring to it as "the grim reaper". To inauthentic 
Dasein, time is the adversary that robs it of its dream of immortality. 
Dasein seeks to evade its nothingness by creating a temporal 
structure which ignores or closes itself off from its "not-yet" 
by making its past present in an infinite series of "nows" and 
projecting this past as static ahead of itself; in effect, making 
the changing changeless. Thus Dasein attempts refusal of being 
its not-yet. 
Heidegger proposes an alternative mode of communication in 
which Dasein can relate to its finitude. It is admittedly not to 
be exemplified in ordinary speaking, rather it is an extra-ordinary 
mode of speaking requiring a break with the security of publicness9 
and the willingness to traverse the abyss of nothingness?creating 
its own path as it goes. It is this possibility that we will explore 
in the next chapter. 
12. 
Chapter III 
Extra-ordinary Speaking! The Authentic Mode of Communication 
The previous chapter which dealt with everyday speaking 
showed how Dasein becomes aware that this mode of speaking is 
deficient, in that as speaker, it is unable to disclose its place 
in the contextual network of relationships of what it speaks 
about because it covers this dimension over by dispersing itself 
in publicness. Thus Dasein in ignoring the ontological dimension 
of speech, discovers there is a lack of meaning in inauthentic 
speech. Just as the man in Plato's cave analogy is drawn out 
of the dim light of the cave and must adjust his eyes to the 
difference in the intensity of light, so too, inauthentic Dasein, 
in taking up its task of coming into being, must move along its 
path, its pace set by the growth of this awareness. Its way is 
unsure for it has given up the comfortable dictatorship of con-
ventional speech and now must forge Its own path In speaking 
authentically. It does not leave everyday speaking behind in 
1. Please see Chapter II, pg. 35 Ft.N. 1. 
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turning to authentic speech, but rather transforms everyday 
speech by "restoring" the ontological dimension to it. This 
needs clarification; for it is really not a case of restoring 
a dimension which is not already there, rather Dasein "remembers" 
his rootedness in being by attending (listening) to the call of 
conscience and responding to its appeal to gather (legein) the 
Self that was dispersed in its everyday speaking, thus letting 
the ontological dimension be seen. 
The imposition of three constituitive aspects can disclose* 
the growth in Dasein's awareness of authentic speaking, emphasiz-
ing the manner in which each part moves Dasein along its path 
toward being. In listening and speaking authentically, Dasein, as 
the wanderer^ is always on the way toward being; a way in which 
* Just as dispersal could never be complete leaving Dasein 
totally in the dark, so too, the gathering of the Self 
(legein) is, in the same manner, never complete; Dasein 
is not totally disclosed as being in the light. 
2. The metaphor of Dasein as wanderer points to the fact 
that being present in a situation is dynamic rather than 
statici for to be is to be on the way. Even the ancients 
understood that static being there is not intelligible, 
e.g., Zeno's arrow at rest paradox. 
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learning to "dwell" in such speech is both a labor of nobility 
and one of stress. To the degree that Dasein "remembers" its 
task, that is, to the degree that listening willingly turns 
toward this dimension in hearing authentically, will it be 
able to respond in its speaking in an authentic manner. Both 
a call and a response, namely a disposition and an action are 
required for speech to be authentic: * therfirst^aspect will 
show a "raison d'etre" that attracts appeals or turnj 
Dasein toward authentic speech which reveals being: for why 
should Dasein care about an alternative mode of speaking such 
as the authentic?; in the second part, it is equally necessary 
to show that, as an active response in the face of this call, 
what is required is the resolve to bear the burden of being, the 
courage to "own" up to the responsibility of resolutely embrac-
ing the finitude that it is in its speaking, thereby speaking 
authentically. The third element is one of homecoming. Firmly 
on its way (in light of its resolve) Dasein, as authentic 
speaker, discloses its Self as "for being and against nothing". 
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Standing in a proper relationship* to being in speaking authen-
tically, Dasein, as this clearing, is on the way out of the 
darkness and into the light. 
In tracing Dasein1s growth of awareness through these 
three constituent elements, we must come to grips with the 
following questions along the wayi Just what is extra-ordinary 
about our listening and speaking in this mode of communication? 
Who is the listener and speaker? What does such speaking speak 
about? Who is spoken to? How does this attempted modification 
of everyday speech transform (if it does at all) Daseinfs 
being-in-the-world and being-with-others? Finally, is authentic 
speech sufficient unto itself? 
Now and then another speaks to Dasein in a manner that is 
different from its everyday speaking, for it seems to reveal the 
"The human essence shows itself here to be the relation 
which first opens up being to man. Being-human, as the 
need of apprehension and collection, is being driven into 
the freedom of his undertaking techne, the sapient 
embodiment of being. This is the character of history", 
(Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 42). 
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truthJ about Dasein and the nature of its relationship to 
entities (things and other Dasein) as one of care which tries to 
take into account "...the full structure of its possibilities" 
as its own. This mode of speaking which discloses Dasein in 
this manner is called extraordinary or authentic speaking. In 
order to understand authentic speech it is first necessary to 
consider how Dasein modifies everyday existence so that it 
becomes authentic. This modification will then be reflected 
in Daseinfs speaking authentically. 
There is nothing esoteric about the term "authentic": 
Authentic existence is not something that floats 
above dispersing everydayness existentially, it 
is only a modified way in which such everydayness 
is seized upon.5 
3. Heidegger defines "truth" as "uncoveredness" (aletheia) 
"...In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, 
and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed, to 
this extent it is essentially 'true1. Dasein i^s in truth, 
This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does not 
purport that Dasein is introduced to all the 'truth', 
either always or just in every case but rather that the 
disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its 
existential constitution." (Being and Time9 pg. 263). 
4. The Meaning of Heidegger, pg. 23 
5. Being and Time, pg. 224. 
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It is crucial therefore that the reader resist the "mystique"* 
that has grown in recent years concerning authenticity qua 
authenticity. This mystique is made up of several elements. 
Perhaps the following three illustrate it most clearly. First 
there is the question whether authenticity is mysterious** in 
the sense that it has to do with otherworldliness; but on the 
contrary, Heidegger points out that "...authentic being-onefs 
Self does not detach Dasein from the world..,"". Second, an 
element of the mystique which is actually inconsistent with its 
supposed 'otherworldliness9 is mis-hearing it as a mere sub-
jectivity, an excuse for "doing your own thing"; but Heidegger 
emphasizes the mistakenness of this perspectives "...man, 
having forgotten what is in totality, adopts measures. ...He 
The distinction should be made between the mistakes of 
inauthentic Dasein under the influence of "Das Man" and 
authentic Dasein which, having set out on its journey 
toward being, needs to clarify its understanding of 
specific elements such a journey entails. 
As we shall see there is^  a note of mystery concerning 
authenticity, due to the fact that while being is 
disclosed in extraordinary speaking, it is not ex-
hausted in this disclosure so that there is something 
left over and there is a sense of mystery. 
6. ibid, pg. 344 
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is the more mistaken the more exclusively he takes himself as 
the measure of all things."^ Finally, the claim of the mystique 
that authenticity is speculative non-sense* does not understand 
that the demand made on behalf of authentic existence and 
authentic speech is not based on abstract speculation but on 
experience; that is, authenticity is expressed in being-in-the-
worlds authentic speech "...discloses the current Situation of 
the "there" in such a way that existence, in taking action, is 
circumspectively concerned with what is factically ready-to-
hand environmentally."8 The force of experience, though rare, 
is unmistakable when it occurs. We must keep in mind that the 
word "authentic" and "own"** have a common root in German namely, 
7. Existence and Being, pg. 316 
* Cf. Adorno, T., Jargon of Authenticity« 
8. Being and Time, pg. 373 
** In his essay, "Martin Heidegger and Man's Wa^ To Be11, 
Professor Adamczewski points out that "...the word commonly 
translated as 'authentic1 is 'eigentlich1; it can also be 
rendered as 'proper1 or 'own'. Let me so express these 
ties of thought: man exists properly as his own self only 
when he acknowledges or owns himself as owing to being. 
Existentially, any owning presupposes owing; and the mostly 
forgotten spirit of the English language will support this, 
because 'own1 originally means as a past participle 
'already owed1." 
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"eigen". It is this connection that is to be our main focus 
as we proceed to uncover the structure of the authentic mode of 
speaking. This is where the correct understanding of the 
German root of authentic, "eigentllch" enters tm speech which 
is "authentic" or "extras-ordinary" is that speech in which 
Dasein not only acknowledges its finitude by restoring a full 
range of possibilities for itself to choose among but in so 
doing, Dasein as speaker$ projects itself upon this possibility 
of its being toward death as its ownmost possibility (eigentllch). 
Thus the restoration of the meaning of human being-there of 
authentic existence brings Dasein into its rightful relationship 
to being in speaking authentically. 
The above overview allows the reader to have some under-
standing of the preliminary structure of authentic speech and 
the elements that Dasein, as speaking authentically* must gather 
together to dwell in such speech. All this of course has been 
alluded to in the most general terms whose purpose is to dispose 
the reader in a proper manner toward a more detailed account of 
the structure of authentic speaking that is to follow^ much in 
9. ibid, pg. 68 Ft. N. 
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the way we study a map prior to venturing forth on a complicated 
journey. Having done this, the way is made ready for the actual 
journey. 
Beginning this first part, of Dasein's journey of coming 
toward its way to be? we shall open our inquiry by asking what 
would prompt Dasein to break away from the untroubled ambiguity 
of everyday speaking and venture forth on its own in speaking 
authentically, braving the discomfort of an uncharted way? For 
if Dasein, due to its thrownness* is lost in the dispersal of 
the many* then if it is "...to find itself at all* it must be 
'shown1 to itself in its possible authenticity."1® Is there 
a phenomenon that can bear witness to the possibility of Self 
being in authentic speech? Conscience can bear witness to the 
possibility of the authentic Self, for it is conscience that 
calls Dasein to be its Self in its speaking; this is precisely 
what authentic speaking means: Dasein speaks authoritatively 
"out" of its own Self.11 
10. ibid, pg. 312 
11. ^Authentic being one's Self does not rest upon an 
exceptional condition of the subject* a condition 
that has been detached from being "Das Man"; it is 
rather an existential modification of the "One"—of 
the "One" as an essential exist entitle.11 (Being and 
Time, pg. 168). 
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Conscience* as a call is a phenomenon of authentic speech. 
This means first of all that for Dasein to hear the call of 
conscience at all, it must have stopped listening to the many; 
its listening must have been interrupted by an address which 
"...arouses another kind of hearing."1 * and exhibits character-
istics that are opposite to the hearing from which Dasein turns 
away. While Inauthentic listening was characterized by dis-
traction, ambiguity and curiosity concerned with entities that 
restricts its hearing to this ontic level, authentic listening 
listens in silence to what it is already disposed to understand; 
this listening is open to and restores the ontological dimension 
to listening by admitting the referential significance of pheno-
mena which discloses the meaning of being. It is listening 
In order to avoid misunderstanding the frame within which 
Heidegger refers to conscience, it is necessary to acquaint 
(or re-acquaint) the reader with Heideggerrs view regarding 
conscience? "The ontological analysis of conscience, is prior 
to any description and classification of experiences of con-
science* and likewise lies outside any biological 'explanation' 
of this phenomenon (which would mean its dissolution). But 
it is also no less distant from a theological exegesis of 
conscience or any employment of this phenomenon for proofs 
of God or for establishing an immediate consciousness of God." 
(Being and Times pg. 313) 
12, ibid, pg* 316 
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which is willing to understand in advance of its being addressed. 
The calling of conscience is a mode of speech! although con-
science calls in silence, it is clearly understood. We must ask 
the following questions in order to clarify the structure of the 
call of conscience! "Who is called"?, "What, is the call about"?, 
and finally* "Who does the calling"?. In ascertaining an answer 
to these questions, we will then ask* "Who speaks"?, in authentic 
speaking, and Dasein can answer in truth, "I do". 
There is that listening and speaking which Dasein experiences 
only too rarely, which reveals a fundamental truth of who it is 
in such speaking. The fundamental truth of authentic speaking 
discloses Dasein's place as one of being a Self which in its 
network of relationships is responsible for being the source of 
meaning in the world* This truth both takes Dasein by surprise 
because it dwells for the most part in the forgetfulness of the 
busy chatter of the market place and does not expect such dis-
closure, and yet also it seems that all of its life has been 
directed toward hearing this speaking. Even so, there is a 
tension in such listening. For although Dasein is drawn toward 
authentic speaking as it is drawn toward home—as if all destiny 
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has driven toward this moment, this listening* this speaking, 
there is still a deep uneasiness of being in a strange and 
unfamiliar place! 
"•••:—oh, why have to be human, and* shunning 
Destiny, long for Destiny? ... 
But because being here amounts to so much, because 
all this Here and Now, so fleeting, seems to require 
us and strangely concerns us. Us the most fleeting 
of all. Just once, everything, only for once. Once 
and no more. And we, too, once. And never again. 
But this having been once, though only once* having 
been once on earth—can it ever be cancelled? 13 
This listening is unlike any listening Dasein is used to* 
for it hears this speaking as a call of Destiny, a direct appeal 
to "One's-Self to become a Self". This call summons Dasein from 
its dispersal in publicness to take up its task of disclosing 
its Self as being-in-the-world. 
Thoreau spoke of the call of conscience in the following 
way! 
Why should we be in such desparate haste to 
succeed and in such desparate enterprises? 
If a man does not keep pace with his compan-
ions, perhaps it is because he hears a 
13. This passage seems unequiviocal enough not to demand 
exegesis. 
The"-Fabric of Existentialism, pg. 357, "The Ninth Elegy", 
by Rilke. 
84, 
different drummer* Let him step to the 
music he hears, however measured and far 
away. It is not important that he should 
mature as soon as an apple tree or an 
oak. ••• 14 
Conscience is in each case mine. The self given by "Das Man", 
that public self, will find such a call "alienating" for this 
public self (Oneself) stands to lose its hold on Dasein in such 
a call.1* Such a call is not understood by others as it gets 
interpreted by a particular Dasein "in accordance with its own 
possibilities of understanding".!" Although conscience calls 
and is therefore discourse it is not communication for there is 
nothing vocal about such a summons; the appeal is "...not put 
into words..." but is made in silence—it is "•..a giving to 
understand".17 As such, the call of conscience is direct and 
14• Walden and other writings of Henry David Thoreau, pg. 290 
15. Being and Time, pg. 318 
"The appeal to the Self in the one-self does not force it 
inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from 
the 'external world1. The call passes over everything like 
this and disperses it, so as to appeal solely to that Self 
which* notwithstanding, is in no other way than Being-in-
the-world." 
16. ibid 
17. ibid, pg* 316 
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without mediation, "While the content of the call is seemingly 
indefinite, the direction it faces is not to be overlooked."1® 
This "...giving to understand" of just how Dasein goes about 
taking up its task of becoming a Self is left indefinite, but that 
it is to do so seems quite certain. Any misunderstanding that 
arises is due to Dasein's hearing, which runs the risk of becoming 
inauthentic if it is publicized, that is, if Dasein listens in-
appropriately as "One" listens concerned with reducing conscience 
to an ontic interest. 
We can now answer the question of who is called. The answer 
is! Dasein. We also know that Dasein is called to take up its 
ownmost possibilities of coming into being. 
But how do we answer the question, "who calls"? Dasein itself 
is the caller. This cannot be an intentional act because as we 
noted above Dasein is taken by surprise by this call.1^ The call 
18. ibid, pg. 318 
19. ibid, pg. 320 
"Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves 
have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily per-
formed, nor have we ever done so. fItf calls (Es ruft...)^ 
against our expectations and even against our will. ..." 
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comes from Dasein but also from "beyond it"
 e What does this mean? 
It means that this summons is not an act of will, rather Dasein 
is summoned by conscience as that which calls it steadily. What 
is that? Anxiety discloses to Dasein that it is "not-at-home" in 
the world in the face of its own finitude, that its absorption with 
the world alienates it from its task of acknowledging its relation 
to being. It is the issue of its finitude in the form of its 
thrownness, that "in the face of which"* Dasein is called to take 
up its task. The task conscience calls Dasein to take up is the 
issue of its being, i.e., its potentiality for being a structural 
whole which it grasps* as the fundamental structure of its existence. 
Therefore the call of conscience is the call of care in which time 
(in authentic ecstases) is manifested as the horizon of being. 
Conscience manifests itself as the call of care! 
the caller is Dasein, which in its thrownness 
(in its being-already-in^ is anxious about its 
potentiality for being. ...The call of con-
science—that is, conscience itself* has its 
ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein 
in the very'basis of its being is care. 20 
We shall see that the possibility of grasping its Self as 
a whole, that is, the way Dasein temporalizes its Self is 
the foundation of the Self, rather than the Self being 
the basis for temporality. 
20* ibid, pg. 322 
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The call of conscience leads Dasein to the realization that 
it is "owing"* and that "...its basic ontological meaning is 
found to be a "deficiency" or lack of something which ought to 
and can be, the ground of negativity** (Nichtigkeit)". 1 
Grounded as Dasein is between being and nothing it must con-
tinually overtake its Self in its finitude; that this effort 
must be continual is due to the fact that facticity is imposed 
on Daseinfs existence, ever challenging it to win its Self anew. 
Dasein experiences its thrownness recurrently in its existence 
thus requiring the re-transcendence of the existent Self in every 
situation. Dasein must accept the negativity which is Unavoid-
able in l t s ^eing an^ gather its Self from its dispersal in 
* The German word for "owing" is "schuldig!1 which is usually 
translated as "guilty". The use of "guilty" which carries 
with it the idea of punishment in the English translation 
tends to lead the reader astray from Heidegger's intention 
of emphasizing the "negativity" that Dasein is* 
** The substitution of "negativity" for "nullity" occurs 
because "nullity" is an absolutely vacuous notion, and 
also has connection with mathematics as a 'quantitative' 
reference, while 'negativity' is not a potential problem. 
Therefore, it is preferable to substitute this alternative 
expression naming that from which this concrescence emerges. 
21. Existence and Being, pg. 69 
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ordinary speaking in the face of this negativity. In accepting 
this ground between being and nothing as the basis of its 
finitude, Dasein willingly takes up its task of coming into 
being, i.e., it lets itself be called into being in choosing to 
disclose its S e l f — a s a whole in speaking authentically* 
I am a wanderer and a mountain climber, he said 
to his heart; I do not like the plains, and it 
seems I cannot sit still for long. And whatever 
may yet come to me as destiny and experience will 
include some wandering and mountain climbing: in 
the end, one experiences only oneself. The time 
is gone when mere accidents could still happen to 
me; and what could still come to me now that was 
not mine already? What returns, what finally 
comes home to me, is my own self and what of 
myself has long been in strange lands and 
scattered among all things and accidents. ... 
In wanting to have a conscience, we find the second consti-
tuent element in growth of Dasein's awareness. Being disposed to 
listen toward the summons to be a Self from its Self, Dasein may 
be said to be resolute: "--this reticent self-projection upon 
one's ownmost owing, in which we are ready for anxiety~we call 
resoluteness". 3 It is when Dasein listens authentically and hears 
22. Thus S^ake Zarathustra, pg. 264 
23. Being and Time, pg. 343 
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speech disclose what is spoken about in its referential totality, 
that such listening includes its Self in this network of contextual 
relations in a meaningful way. This meaningful listening consti-
tutes the significance of a destiny; as being its destiny Dasein 
understands that human being is for saying, th&t is, Dasein res-
ponds to this summons of conscience by disclosing its Self as a 
structural whole in exhibiting its being-in-the-world when it 
shows its Self as speakerI 
"Appropriation (Ereignis) in beholding human nature, 
makes mortals appropriate for that which avows itself 
from everywhere to man in Saying, which points toward 
the concealed. Man's, the listener's, being made 
appropriate for Saying, has this distinguishing 
character, that it releases human nature into its 
own, but only in order that man as he who speaks, 
that is, he who says, may encounter and answer 
Saying, in virtue of what is his property. It iss 
the sounding of the word, the encountering saying 
of mortals is answering. Every spoken word is 
already an answers counter-saying, coming to 
encounter, listening Saying..."24 
If ordinary listening and speaking were characterized by 
their publicness, then authentic listening and speaking may be 
said to be characterized as "original" i.e., that speech which 
in belonging to one's-Self discloses that Self as originating 
in being (original). In the primary sense this mode of speech 
24. On The Way To Speech, pg. 129 
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(discourse) is one in which authentic Dasein discloses its Self-
as-being- in-the-world» In the first, inauthentic mode, speech 
disclosed Dasein in its inauthenticity, as taking its meaning 
from the world, that is, in determining itself in terms of the 
world. It is resoluteness which frees Dasein from its absorbing 
concern with the everyday world by modifying its temporal 
structures 
In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought 
back from distraction with objects of one's closest 
concern, but it gets held in the future and in 
having been. That Present which is held in authentic 
temporality and which is authentic itself, we call 
the "moment of vision". 
...'In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; 
but as an authentic waiting towards, the moment of 
vision permits us to encounter for the first time 
what can be 'in a time' as ready to hand or present 
at hand.25 
Freed from the inauthentic mode Dasein can thus turn to the second 
mode, original speech, in which authentic Dasein discloses itself 
25 in disclosing the world• In the second, "original" speech, 
authentic Dasein discloses its Self in disclosing the world, i.e., 
in letting entities be seen, as they are in their being, thereby 
"...realizing its responsibility as the unique source of meaning 
25. Being and Time, pg. 387-88 
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in the world..8"26 Authentic speech lets what is spoken about be 
seen as what it is, that is, it lets entitites show themselves in 
their contextual completeness. This "letting-be-seen" is what 
Heidegger finds in communications 
"...In discourse $ird<p*LYft*)t so far as it is 
genuine, what is said [was geredet ist] is drawn 
from what the talk is about, so that discursive 
communicationt in what it says lin ihrem Gesagten], 
makes manifest what it is talking about, thus 
making it accessible to the other party. This is 
the structure of th^lSycs as^^^ipa /W/S • (Its 
structural form is <jy irflteifts) . Here synthesis has 
a purely apophantical signification and means 
letting it be seen in its togetherness [Beisammenl 
with something—-letting it be seen as something. ,.."27 
"Original" has the meaning here of disclosing what was unnamed 
and therefore hidden, and in naming it, bringing it to light. But 
this also means that this mode of speech does more than note that 
entities are disclosed within a context in general; it gives con- i 
sideration to this context as manifesting a network of relation-
ships in their specificity, to which meaning accrues. To put it 
another ways because the context varies, the network of relation-
ships varies too, and therefore there is no fixed meaning to what 
26. The Meaning of Heidegger, pg. 28 
27. Being and Time, pg. 56 
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is shown. To fix meaning is to abstract entities from their 
context; this in turn covers them over or hides them, as happened 
in inauthentic speaking. Therefore, authentic speaking is also 
"original" in the sense of showing the being of entities, that is, 
illuminating existence in a creative, open* imaginative and fresh 
way. 
In everyday existence, Dasein comes up against the dictator-
ship of "Das Man" which inauthentically addresses Dasein seeking 
its assent by inviting it to respond in kind. Thoreaufs dialogue 
with his tailoress lends itself to our closer scrutiny as an 
instance of authentic speech% 
When I ask for a garment of a particular form, my 
tailoress tells me gravely, "They do not make them 
so now," not emphasizing the "They" at all, as if 
she quoted an authority as impersonal as the Fates, 
and I find it difficult to get made what I want* 
simply because she cannot believe that I mean what 
I say, that I am so rash. When I hear this oracular 
sentence, I am for a moment absorbed in thought, 
emphasizing to myself each word separately that I 
may come at the meaning of it, that I may find out 
by what degree of consanguinity, They are related 
to me, and what authority they may have in an affair 
which affects me so nearly; I am inclined to answer 
her with equal mystery, and without any more emphasis 
of the "they"---"It is true they did not make them so 
recently, but they do now.28 
28. Waldenand other writings of Henry David Thoreau, pg. 22 
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In replying to Thoreau's request for a garment cut in a particular 
fashion, the tailoress responds inauthentically. On what basis do 
we make this claim? She could have responded in the following 
wayss "I must send away for a pattern for such a garment."; "I 
donft know how to make a pattern for the garment you want."; or 
she might even have replied in a negative manner sruch as, "I have 
not made such a garment, nor do I want to.". Instead, the tailor-
ess proposes that "they" take the responsibility for the garment's 
unavailability by bringing the authority of the amorphous "they" 
to bear on the situation. 
In contrast to the tailoress's conventional speaking, Thoreau, 
in listening authentically, apprehends her invitation to give his 
assent to such dispersal. Will Thoreau indeed take the easy way 
out by giving his Self over to dispersal in publicness in his 
response or gather his Self, that is, bring his Self to stand 
forth as speaker, in speaking authentically? In questioning his 
relationship to "them", Thoreau takes hold of the situation by 
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firmly willing (resolving) to be a Self in responding authentically. 
His response modifies the self as "One" of many, under the Self. 
Thus speaking authentically, does not mean that conventional speech 
is left behind*, rather conventional speech is transformed. 
The modification of inauthentic speech takes place when Dasein 
responds to the call of conscience appropriately in its resolute-
ness and becomes the Self out of which it speaks (e.g., as in 
Thoreau's case when he replies as himself, "They did not make them 
so recently, but they do now".) In understanding that its poten-
tiality for being includes both un-truth and truth, depending on 
its decision to he the ffnot-I" of in-authentic speech or, like 
27, Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 17 
"To question is to will to know. He who wills, he who puts 
his whole existence into a will is resolved. Resolve does 
not shift about, it does not shirk, but acts out of the 
moment and never stops. Resolve is no mere decision to act, 
but the crucial beginning of action that anticipates and 
reaches through all action. To will is to be resolved. ..." 
[The essence of willing i# here carried back to determina-
tion Ilnt-schlossenheit, unclosedness ...] The connection 
of resolve with clearing and letting be follows in the quote 
but we must put off dealing with these crucial concepts 
until we have reached a more appropriate point below, 
(see pg.lll). 
* Just as inauthentic existence is not left behind in 
Dasein's struggle to exist authentically, so too, authentic 
speech does not leave inauthentic speech behind. 
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Thoreau to be the Self out of which it speaks, Dasein takes hold 
28 
of un-truth authentically. The resolve to illuminate existence 
frees Dasein from the dictatorship of "Das Man" in ordinary speech 
and discloses its Self in authentic speaking as being in truth. 
The choice to be an authentic speaker is not made apart from 
being-in-the-world and being-witfo~others, rather these structures 
are disclosed in light of Daseinfs finitude in concrete situation 
in which Dasein exemplifies its potentiality for being in its 
transparency. 
In speaking authentically, Dasein uses metaphors^ adages, 
aphorisms, and similes just as it did in its everyday speaking, 
but now instead of covering over its finitude, through them Dasein 
discloses the meaning of human being as finite. The purpose of 
speaking authentically, then, is the disclosure of man's place in 
being as being finite. The following are examples of authentici 
speech precisely because they Illuminate existence in just such a 
28« "As care, however, Dasein has been Determined by facticity 
and dispersal. Disclosed in its 'there' it maintains itself 
both in truth and in un-truth with equal primordiality. 
This 'really1 holds in particular for resoluteness as 
authentic truth. Resoluteness appropriates un-truth 
authentically. (Being and Time, pg. 345) 
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manner* "God is dead"^ and the "Eclipse of God"^u are surely 
alternative ways of speaking about the self-same human relation, 
ways which express genuinely different ontologically-grounded 
attitudes to similar moments of human existence. In recalling 
Caesar's words as he crossed the Rubicon river, "the di&eis cast"31$ 
the saying no longer reveals what it revealed originally in merely 
refering to Caesar's particular situation, but the claim that 
decision closes off some possibilities in choosing this one, is 
meaningful, as it reveals a recurring structure in the experience 
of various Dasein, namely that freedom (choice) discloses man as 
finite "For everything there is a season, and a time for every 
matter under heaven % a time to be born and a time to die; a time 
to plant, and a time to pluck what is planted.11^ .This is the* 
first among a list of opposites given in Ecclesiastes concerning 
happenings In time. It is not that man is to concern himself only 
with the proper time of each thing but rather with the propriety 
29. The Joyful Wisdom, pg. 125 
30. Eclipse of God, Martin Buber 
31. Julius Ca^s4r 
32. Ecclesiastes 3:2 
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of time as such. This list of opposites reminds man that what is 
proper to him is his finitude; time is the horizon on which being 
becomes man, in which man as human being is bound to live out his 
life. Finally the speech of that lover, who meeting the pain of 
the loss of his beloved, affirms existence in the face of finitude 
in affirming his loves "It is better to have loved and lost than 
never to have loved at all."^ These expressions are boun of 
Dasein's attempts to come to terms with its thrownness in a parti-
cular situation and as such, to state the truth (concerning its 
finitude) about the being of Daseinfs way to be. The following 
examplej while not fitting in the above classification, nevertheless 
fulfills the same purpose namely the disclosure of man's place as 
finite through negation. The modification of convention which 
involves the ethical dimension can show itself in authentic speech 
in "No-saying", e.g.* in saying "No" to having a casual affair not 
because society does not condone it, or religious sanction forbids 
it—but because Dasein does not choose such a relationship as a 
way to be of its ownmost being, "No saying" speaks out of the 
authentic Self in a more forceful way than the preceding examples 
33. In Mefltariam^ Tennyson 
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even show, indicating that what is proper to Dasein is that it is 
itself that relationship which discloses being and this it does 
in authentically speaking out of its Self; speaking which discloses 
man as being between being and nothing and in choosing to be 
speaker chooses being. 
Resolve not only frees Dasein from the imposition of "Das 
Man", thereby coming to have a Self out of which it speaks, but 
because it speaks authentically and discloses this resolution in 
its speaking, Dasein can "call" others to take up their task of 
becoming a Self. There are those few who share our path and "help" 
us on our way. In using the word, "help", it must be in no way 
understood that the other takes pity on us as Buber would have us 
believe is Heidegger's only possibility of community^ (authen-
tically being there with the other); it is not like this at all. 
The other, having taken up his ownmost task, calls us forth to 
do likewise. Socrates comes to mind as an example of calling 
34. Between Man and Mans pg. 207 
Man is never a community in the sense Buber puts forth. In 
Heidegger's discussion of a maxim of Parmenides, he declares: 
"...Man's selfhood means this: he must transform the being 
that discloses itself to him into history and bring himself 
to stand in it. Selfhood does not mean that he is primarily 
an "ego" and an individual. This he is no more than he is 
a we, a community." (Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 121) 
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others to conscience. His call comes from the heart, out of con-
cern for their neglect of their task of Self-understanding. His 
continual questioning of popular opinion (conventional wisdom) made 
him a threat to the comfortable dispersal of the many. At his 
trial Socrates reminds the community that he pleads not in his 
own behalf but in theirs, that he may prod or stir them to take 
up, the challenge of becoming themselves: 
It is literally true, even if it sounds rather 
comical, that God has specially appointed me to this 
city, as though it were a large thorough-bred horse 
which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy 
and needs the stimulation of some stinging fly. It 
seems to me that God has attached me to this city to 
perform the office of such a fly and all day long I 
never cease to settle here, there and everywhere, 
rousing, persuading and reproving everyone of you." 
This speaking does not originate with the others rather the 
other addresses himself to me and it is my already awakened 
primordial being, that is disposed, in listening to the call of 
conscience to respond to what is made manifest in his speaking. 
What is made manifest in his speaking is his rootedness in being 
and it is this ground which we share in our mutual disclosure. 
This "being-with" differs from that of ordinary speech due to 
•35. Apology, 30 d - e 
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resolution. In speaking authentically, resolution brings this 
shared ground "within reach" (brings this shared ground into view) 
for Dasein. For being with others resolutely, that is* respecting 
their potentiality for being, lets other Dasein be them-Selves. 
It becomes possible: 
...to co-disclose this potentiality in the 
solitude which leaps forth and liberates. 
When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 
'conscience' of Others. Only by authentically 
being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people 
authentically be with one another—not by 
ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative 
fraternizing in the crowd and in what the "many" 
want to undertake• 36 
Polonius' parting words to Laertes is also an example of a call 
to conscience that issues from a possibly inauthentic Dasein but 
nevertheless when heard aright discloses the truth of who man is: 
This above all: to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow, as the night the day, 
thou canst not then be false to any man. 37 
36. Being and Time, pg. 344 
37. Just as authentic speech can be covered over by inauthentic 
listening, the possibility exists that what is spoken in-
authentically (as in Polonius' case because this passage 
is interpreted by some as an "old saw" by a sententious 
old man and by others as an example of Shakespeare's own 
wisdom) may disclose the truth when it is heard 
authentically. 
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Resolution brings the third element to light which is one 
of homecoming. The growth of Dasein's awareness has brought it 
to the point of gathering its Self in speaking authentically, from 
its dispersal in inauthentic speaking. Dasein discloses its Self 
in this speaking acknowledging the claim of being, that is* of 
being that relation out of which it speaks in speaking authentically. 
But this gathering is not of the nature of a "collage" in which 
bits and pieces of flotsam are glued together into a Self: 
...It is logos as ingathering, as man's collecting-
himself toward fitness<Fug> that first brings 
being-human into its essence, so thrusting it into 
homelessness, insofar as the home is dominated by 
the appearance of the ordinary, customary and 
commonplace.38 
This gathering is the bringing together in the way of maintaining 
disparate elements in tension. Man maintains his Self as the between 
of being and nothing and discloses himself as such in speaking au-
thentically. Our focus on this third aspect concerns Dasein's 
awareness of itself as authentic speaker which discloses its Self 
as being ever on the way home, drawing ever closer to being*. 
38. Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 142 
& There is no implication here that drawing closer to being is 
the result of human intentionality (this attitude would return 
us to the problem of "insistence") for as we shall see, it is 
being that draws man closer. 
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Coming home for human being is placing its Self in this between as 
being speaker—-more fundamentally as being this between, as making a 
£?^e in its speaking for being in the face of its finitude• 
Homecoming then, is Daseinfs coming to "dwell" in this between, 
disclosing such habitation in its speaking authentically. This 
means becoming aware that "dwelling" has a dual nature, neither 
side of which may be excluded. 
Where conventional speech afforded inauthentic Dasein the 
comfort and tranquility of not being responsible for its speaking, 
Dasein, in disclosing its rootedness in being in speaking authen-
tically, thereby discloses its relationship to being as one of 
privilege and also one of anxiety, For what distinguishes man from 
all other entities is that he alone can disclose being in speaking 
in letting it enter into the word, as the following lines from 
Rilke's The Ninth Elegy so richly portray* The following exegesis 
(with the reader's indulgence) can help us better understand the 
three elements mentioned above through which Dasein moves toward 
authentic speech: 
39. Here we must take heed of Heidegger's warning not to think that 
Dasein takes its orientation from the "between" as such^rather 
Dasein is its Self this "between". Thus as this "between" 
Dasein in the "being-there" of its being is^  the "clearing" 
for being. We will return to this point shortly. (See 
Heidegger's discussion of this point in Being "and Time9 
pg. 170-171) 
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...For the wanderer doesn't bring from the mountain 
slope a handful of earth to the valley, untellable 
earth, but only some word he has won, a pure word, 
the yellow and blue gentian. Are we, perhaps, here 
just for saying: House, Bridge, Fountain, Gate, 
Jug, Olive Tree, Window,—possibly: Pillar, Tower?... 
but for saying, remember, oh, for such saying as 
never the things themselves hoped so intensely to 
be. ... 4 0 
There is a disturbing note in the very first line. Rilke describes 
Dasein as a "wanderer", No, that is not quite strong enough. The 
line reads, "For the wanderer...". What difference does the 
emphasis of a change in the use of an article make? In the first 
sense, being a wanderer* is an accidental characteristic which may 
or may not be of importance* The use of the proper article does 
make a difference, since it suggests that being a wanderer is not 
accidental but a part of manfs essential nature, or stronger still, 
the heart of such a nature. 
The wanderer brings something to our attention, something that 
he has brought from "the mountain slope to the valley" (from afar 
to here?). That "something" is given by contrast: it is first 
given as what it is not. We are told that what is brought is not 
40. The Fabric of Existentialism, pg. 358
 9
 lfThe Ninth Elegy", 
by Rilke. 
* See page 73 this chapter. 
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a "handful of earth". Admittedly this is not very helpful, but 
this "handful of earth" does have a negative characteristic; it 
is "untellable"| this means, if we take Rilke literally, that this 
"earth" is un-able to tell. Unable to tell what? We donft know 
yet. Juxtaposed to "untellable earth" is--"...but only some word 
he has won, a pure word, the yellow and blue gentian." The "...but 
only some" jumps out at us. "You mean the "poor" wanderer has 
come all this way to bring us "*.*but only some word he has won..."? 
It is as if the struggle to win the word and the journey to bring 
such a prize seem hardly worthwhile. But is this really the case 
or is there something hidden that somehow off-sets the "...but 
only..."? 
First of all this "questionable" prize is a "pure word11. It 
is not clear whether Rilke has in mind "pure" in the sense of its 
being "free from defects" or "virginal" as in the sense that it is 
an unused word. This remains unclear so far.* Our second clue is 
given by means of metaphor; the "word" is "the yellow and blue 
Is it possible that "pure" has to do with the way naming 
gives a fresh context in letting entities be seen as what 
they are in the word? This is admittedly a speculative 
point as far as Rilkefs poem is concerned, but it is none-
theless a possibility which has merit in so far as it is 
in keeping with the task of this chapter. 
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gentian". Gentian are flowers found in the Alps. High above the 
last timberstand and most vegetation, the hiker or mountain 
climber comes upon them unexpectedly, finding them nestled among 
the rocks in the snow. Against the grey of the rock and the white 
of the snow, the brilliant colors of these fragile flowers seem an 
unexpected gift. Their being found in the clearing, where little 
else grows and what does grow has to struggle for survival, is 
not lost upon the on^looker, 
But what is Rilkefs point? The point is made by use of two 
contrasting moods in raising the question,:-. "Are we, perhaps here 
just for saying?"; he then lists the names that man gives to 
entities but the reader1s response to the list of names is 
possibly one of impatience and boredom. If it is so much the 
better, for there is nothing that drives a point home like having 
the reader disclose the authorfs meaning for him. The key word 
is "remember". Rilke is asking the reader, who at the beginning 
of the poem perhaps saw such a "prize" and "journey" as "hardly 
worthwhile", to remember that speech is man's privilege; that in 
naming things he lets them be. It is a point that man takes for 
granted in his forgetfulness. Thus, we find two contrasting moods, 
forgetfulness and remembrance: the wanderer, in letting being 
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dwell within the word, in naming things, takes an almost casual 
attitude toward this en-nobling gift, one of forgetfulness, until 
he remembers that except for such saying the privilege that sets 
man apart from things is hidden from view. That which man takes 
for granted and seems of little or no consequence is truly a rich 
gift, it is not a gift to be taken lightly, for it is through 
speech that being is made manifest in letting entities be seen 
as what they are. As speaker, that man, in taking up his task, 
intensifies existence in a way that being a thing cannot, i.e., 
the earth cannot tell its nature. Let us make Rilke1s point even 
more emphatic. Man, in disclosing being, i.e., in letting entities 
be seen as what they are, in speaking authentically, discloses 
that his nature is the disclosure of being; that man is—in 
disclosing the being of entities. Man is indeed here for Saying. 
The meaning of human being is Saying, (disclosure)• 
In surveying the above exegesis, we find we are left with the 
feeling that we have tied all loose threads neatly together; well, 
all that is, except two small ones. The two small thoughts we have 
left unattended are privilege and "letting things be" in naming 
them. The two are connected, so let us pose our question in such 
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a way that they are both included. In what sense is naming things 
a privilege? Why for instance, do we say privilege and not right? 
Well, for one thing, right would imply mastery which leads to dis-
tortion due to neglect of the ontological dimension. Privilege 
indeed implies that naming things, that bringing the being of 
entities to stand in the word is not manfs doing. Man names that 
which gives itself. 
In what way then, are we to understand resolution in connec-
tion with letting being give itself? It is possible that the word 
"appropriation" leads to a mis-understanding in that man might seem 
to acquire a possession of the being of entities in some way? The 
answer is no; no sense of possession is involved, as a matter of 
fact just the opposite is the case. Perhaps we should abandon the 
word "appropriation" for the moment and instead use the word 
"apprehension". We must take care here however that we do not 
incur the same misunderstanding that we did with "appropriation". 
Therefore, we must begin by stressing that: 
...Apprehension...is not a faculty belonging to 
a man already defined; apprehension is rather a 
process in which man first enters into history 
as a being, an essent, i.e., comes into being. 
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Apprehension is not a function that man has 
as an attribute but...is the happening that has 
man. ...The separation between being and being-
human comes to light in this togetherness. 41 
Apprehension, then, is a receptive attitude toward being* 
Dasein-releases its hold on entitles, a hold which confines them 
to the ontic dimension and this it does through a "proper" 
disposition which acknowledged the hold being has on man; 
Apprehension is not just a pastime that man takes up din his idle 
hourrs* or to-exercise his "spiritual" or "psychological" faculties: 
No, apprehension is wrested from the habitual 
press of living—-and by a contrary movement. 
Its 'bond with the being of the essent does 
not make itself. To name is not*merely to 
ascertain a fact, but points to the struggle 
by which it is forged. ...41a 
Let us return to appropriation* It is to be understood in 
the same way. Appropriation is: 
The yielding owning,... (which) confers 
more than any effectuation, making or 
founding. .... (It is) the giving yield 
whose giving reach alone is what gives 
us such things as a "there is"... . ^ 2 
41. Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 119 
4la ibid, pgt-14r 
42. On the Way to Speech, pg. 127 
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Thus privilege is a granting to man by being of that to 
which man belongs. Saying, grants man a hold on being and in 
speaking authentically man takes up the way that is proper to 
him: 
...the significance of speech, its signing and 
marking, forming role for man can be wholly re-
membered when it is derived from its ground, when 
its demand belongs not to beings expressed but to 
the horizon on which they emerge—the horizon of 
being as such. His proper speech is for each 
man his Ex-pressed Hold In Being: in his human 
being. 
Speech is man's power to anchor himself in being, 
his security, his record, his witness, prior to 
his manipulation of entities. 43 
Does this bring us any closer to understanding the second part of 
the question concerning "letting being give itself"? Is Heidegger 
suggesting Dasein is to be indifferent to the being of entities, 
that it let entities sort of "hang out" in the vicinity while 
Dasein decides whether or not to take notice of them as it would any 
other thing? Heidegger is quite clear that the "letting-be of 
what is" is not to be mis-construed as indifference or neglect* 
The phrase we are now using, namely the "letting-
be" of what is, does not however, refer to indiff-
erence and neglect, but to the very opposite of 
them. To let something be (seinlassen) is in fact 
to have something to do with it (sich einlassen 
auf)• This is not to be taken merely in the sense 
of pursuing, conserving, cultivating and planning 
43. TragicProtest, pg* 251 
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some actuality causally met with or sought out. 
To let what-is be what it is means participating 
in something overt and its overtness, in which 
everything that "is" takes up its position and 
which entails such overtness. Westemn thought 
at its outset conceived this as ^ 4 4/lll£/ea 
the unconcealed. ...Participation in the 
revealed nature of what is does not stop there, 
it develops into a retirement before it so that 
what-is may reveal itself as what and how it is, 
and the approximation which represents it in 
the statement may take it for a criterion. In 
this manner "letting-be" exposes itself (setzt 
sich aus) to what-is-as-suclx and brings all 
behavior into the open (versetzt lbs offene)*^4 
The open into which the "letting-be" of Saying brings man 
is what Heidegger also calls the "clearing". What is it that is 
cleared? Dasein is itself "cleared" in that wanting to be the 
Self out of which it speaks, it emerges from being-covered over 
(as being the "not-I" that speaks in ordinary speaking), out of 
the darkness of this covering, into the lights 
The light* which constitutes this clearedness... 
—is what we have defined as "care". 
...Ecstatical themporality clears the ythere? 
primordially ."45" 
44. Existence ^ and Being, pg. 305-6. From the essay "On the 
Essence of Truth". 
* We must repeat Heidegger1s warning that "light" "...is not 
something ontically present-at-hand as a power source for a 
radiant brightness occurring in the entity on occassion." 
Being and Time, pg. 401) 
45. Being and Time, pg. 402 
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Extra-ordinary listening and speaking give full "play" to 
all three ecstases of temporality, past, present and future with 
acknowledgement of course to the special emphasis on the openness 
of the future in which the past comes toward the present out of 
the future. There is no attempt to cover over or exclude any one 
moment of temporality from the other two. The three moments are 
unified and it is this unity which forms the horizon of being, the 
field upon which being and man be^long. Authentic speech discloses 
Dasein as speaker, as being in proper relationship to time and in 
this way time as the horizon of being brings Dasein into the 
clearing of being. The clearing then is a place of truth; place 
meaning a different way of being*! 
k,.* .any being can only be as being, if it stands out 
and into what is cleared in this clearing. Only 
this clearing yields and warrants for us men a 
passage toward what is other than ourselves.^6 
The clearing grants direct access to truth** which means the openness 
* ...The very way-to-be of truth is primal strife which is striven 
for in that open medium into which beings stand out and through 
which they repose in themselves. (Origin of the^Work of Art, pg.43) 
46. Origin of the Work^of Art, pg. 41. Tr. Dr. Z. Adamczewski. 
** The reader must be reminded that nature of truth for Heidegger is 
"...discoveredness which at the same time under the sway of 
*refusial%« *f! as was pointed out in the introduction. Therefore 
"access" to truth provided by the "clearing" never is clearing 
without covering or to put it another way in speaking authenti-
cally Dasein never moves out of the darkness and into the light 
once and for all. This point will be made again in the conclusion. 
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of being-there of human being is brought to stand in being. 
Freedom^? ±s freedom to move toward being which draws man toward 
it as giving itself to him but at the same time it is also the way 
which becomes him in his human being. Authentic speech is extra-
ordinary in that the disclosure of being as "extra" dimension, that 
is, the dimension of truth, is shown. In disclosing its Self as 
being-in truth, truth is restored to the rightful domain 6f 
being, whereas in everyday speech, truth was the property of man. 
It is this modification which makes possible Daseinfs poten-
tiality for grasping itself as a whole, that is, for having a Self 
at all. This modification of temporality in everyday speech sets 
Daseinfs mis-relation to time right by restoring the future to its 
proper place* Dasein1s speech is authentically temporalized by 
"letting-itself-come-toward-itself out of the future. •• ff^°; 
47. ^...freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-
is*»as~such (das Seiende als ein solehes). The revelation 
of this is itself guaranteed in that ex-istent participation 
whereby the overtness of the overt (die Offenheit des 
Offenen) , i.e., "There" (Da) of it, is what it is." 
(Existence and Being, pg. 307, from the essay, "On The 
Essence of Truth"). 
48. Being and Time, pg. 273 
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Dasein expresses its negativity as its ownmost possibility for 
being, which in coming toward Dasein frees it for the joyful 
creativity of an open horizon in which new meaning is possible. 
At the same time, in giving up its attitude of revenge (reminiscent 
of Nietzsche) toward the fixedness of the past and its "it was" 
in its authentic speaking, Dasein can, by accepting responsibility 
for the past, respectfully glean the richness of meanings it 
offers, thereby preserving its originality as a guide for the 
future. And what of the present? 
Without the need to distort either the future or the past, 
the present too is modified; instead of being an infinite series 
of "nows" which manifested the fixedness of the past made present 
closed off from the future, the present, as a "moment of vision" 
reveals the ecstatic structure as whole, i.e., there, in the 
present, Dasein can bring the past and future together. 
There, in the light of the integration of the three ecstases, 
being is revealed, enabling Dasein in its authentic speaking to 
reveal the meaning of human being. As being this ecstatic unity, 
Dasein moves out of the darkness and into the light, again and 
again. 
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Our purpose in discussing the Rilke poem is to call attention 
to the two characteristics exhibited in Dasein1s coming to speak 
authentically: We have spoken of speech as a privilege but said 
little of the feeling that man is "not-at-home" in authentic speech. 
Manfs understanding "that he is (indeed) hereof or Saying", grows 
slowly as he becomes aware of what it means to speak authentically. 
As this awareness grows, Dasein more willingly grasps the anxiety 
of not being athome in this speaking. Homelessness is not dis-
sipated but Dasein reaches toward being in spite of it, "yet as 
soon as man reflects on homelessness, it is no longer a mystery."^9 
Dasein, as wanderer, must come to understand the nature of his 
"uncanniness" as the task which he must acknowledge and appropriate, 
and thus come to dwell" in this speaking. To be more specific, 
when Dasein is asked "Who listens or speaks"? it says, "I do", 
speaking out of the source of its Self. As speaker, Dasein will 
disclose its Self as that relationship which discloses being. 
The concern of authentic listening and speaking then is being. 
As speaker, Dasein reveals its Self as standing in relation to 
being, as THAT relationship which, in its human being, reveals being. 
49. Questions ^in Heidegger !s Thought About Being, pg. 15 
Essay by Dr. Z. Adamczewski. 
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It is this relationship which it discloses to other Dasein in 
speaking authentically. So that when Dasein is asked, "What is 
spoken about"?, it can answer that speaking discloses being. 
When it is asked "Who is spoken to"?, the answer is that others, 
as Selves, hear what is disclosed, and respond to this disclosure 
in their speaking. Authentic listening and speaking then disclose; 
the between which man is. It discloses that he is between being 
and nothing and de-cides for being. 
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Conclusion 
The journey toward an understanding of the way communication 
is constituted, is primarily prompted by the rare but nonetheless 
profound speaking (extra-ordinary) which is different from the 
ordinary speaking we engage in, in our day to day living. The 
difference in these two kinds of speaking is striking, yet in 
the beginning, perhaps the most we can say is that the one, 
extra-ordinary, seems to illuminate existence, that is, it pro-
vides us with meaning in a way, paradoxically, that the speaking 
with which we are most familiar and closest to does not. In 
wondering why and how this is so we are led to ask after the 
nature of speech itself. 
We began by inquiring into the nature of speech and it 
became clear almost immediately that our focus on speech gave way 
to the realization that listening is prior to and indeed deter-
mines the way speaking discloses being-in-the-world. Listening 
turns out to be the decisive key in approaching speech. 
There are two modes^of listening, manipulative and respon-
sive, just as there are two modes of speaking, inauthentic and 
authentic, which result from the way Dasein^listens. Either 
listening may refuse to admit that which grounds entities; that 
which, in being named is disclosed in its contextual unity to 
117. 
listening, in which Dasein1s insistence in ignoring this ground 
can be termed manipulative^or when listening lets speech be 
itself, that is, it (listening) lets speech disclose the context-
ual referential totality which gives itself to listening. In 
this manner, listening may be said to be re-sponsive to what 
is given in speech. 
In the first instance, manipulative listening attempts to 
abstract entities from the ground out of which they are given 
in speech in order to confine them on the ontic level in which 
such preservation re-presents them in their "sameness" along an 
infinite horizon, e.g., a tree is a tree, is a tree. If you 
name one tree, you have named them all. Paradoxically, in so 
doing, listening closes itself off from the open horizon which 
discloses the meaning of being in speaking; meaning which mani-
pulation claims to seek. Yet this ground is given whether or 
not listening acknowledges such ground. Listening that is 
responsive is that listening which in acknowledging this ground 
restores the ontological dimension to speech in ad-mitting 
entities in their contextual referential significance. 
If listening corresponds to entities speech names in words, 
then the word discloses the entity in its being, in its contextual 
totality. Moreover, the word opens the way in gathering what 
118. 
naming presences, i.e., being. Thus the character of speech 
emerges only when man ceases to be insistent in his listening; 
when he frees speech from his domination, speech discloses 
entities as what they are in the word to listening which admits 
this dimension to the hearing. The confinement of the mode of 
being as "having been" under manfs manipulation of speech is 
also transformed when there is forbearance of speech, that is, 
it is not insistent. The context in which listening lets speech 
say what is given, is taken into consideration. Speech reflects 
the givenness of entities as being given in a context. The 
significance of the context which recognizes the play of all 
three ecstases, past, present and future, is preserved. The 
past, the thing as "having been" comes into the present out of 
the future. This unity of being and time is expressed in human 
speech as "stillness". The ground and the thing are disclosed 
in the word as belonging together. This unity is given by 
speech to be spoken by man. Responsive listening hears that 
which reaches toward man in speech so that in preserving it he 
may say what is heard* 
The nature of speech then implies that all communication 
arises out of being, that is, the purpose of speech is to disclose 
what is given to it; in naming entities, speech shows them as what 
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they are. Whether speech makes this disclosure in addressing 
listening depends on the intent of listening which all too often 
disregards the nature of speech in its insistence on domination 
of it. The question is why? What is the point of Dasein1s 
insistence in a listening that manipulates speech in confining 
entities to the ontic dimension forgetting the ontological 
dimension? 
The answer to these questions comes when our inquiry moves 
toward the two alternative modes of speech disclosed by listen-
ing. The first of these two modes is ordinary or inauthentic 
speaking. Speech is ordinary in that it bears the use of our 
day to day living, but is inauthentic in that this speaking is 
that which tends to cover over and confine speech to the ontic 
dimension. 
In seeking to give meaning to its fleeting existence, 
Dasein attempts to deny its finitude by covering it over in its 
listening. Subsequently, it tries to manipulate speech in such 
a way that such insistence discloses human being as infinite. 
It seeks to accomplish this by dispersing itself as speaker so 
its speaking cannot disclose it in its finitude. Such attempted 
dispersal is not total or there could be no possibility of an 
alternative mode of speaking. 
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We find three constituent aspects of ordinary speaking 
which reflect the growth of Dasein's awareness! the first aspect 
reflects the fact that Dasein is "caught up" in everyday speaking 
in its fascination with entities. This fascination takes the 
form of attempting to become like them in dispersing itself in 
inauthentic speech in an effort to avoid change, in the mistaken 
belief (mistaken because of the way it manipulates speech) that 
it can thus escape its destiny as a finite being. The second 
aspect is characterized by anxiety which frees Dasein from its 
fascination with entities, making it possible for Dasein to gain 
some distance from everyday speaking as it faces its finitude. 
This results in the third aspect which takes the form of a 
decision either to flee its death by re-absorbing itself in the 
world or take hold of its finitude. 
Thrown into an already established "public" or conventional 
mode of speaking Dasein drifts along in a state of contentment 
agreeably giving itself over to such conventionality in an 
unquestioning manner, mistaking that which prevails in it 
(publicness) as the whole of reality. In so doing it mistakes 
its being "One" among many for its Self in thinking it to be 
speaker. It indulges in "idle talk, gossip and hearsay" for the 
content of its speaking and directs this speaking to those who, 
like itself, are caught up in the anonymity of "Das Man". 
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Recognition of itself as^  "Das Man" in speaking out of its 
anonymity is a gradual process in which the degree listening to 
that which speech speaks of determines the degree Dasein!s 
interest becomes absorbed by entities. Conventional speech, 
however, in recognizing this factor lessens the impact of 
possible authentic listening by putting forward its own emphasis 
on listening as "One" listens* Listening by "One" amounts to 
listening indifferently in that it abstracts the entity talked 
about from the ground of being; this is characterized by locating 
everything in the past. This attempt to confine entities to the 
past as "having been" seeks to avoid disclosing a network of 
meaning which includes Dasein. The attempt to forget its finitude 
by covering it over characterizes Dasein?s everyday speaking 
fproximally and for the most part1. In dispersing its Self as 
speaker, there is no Self to stand in relation to disclosure of 
being. Due to the distortion of the inauthentic ecstases, in 
which Dasein closes itself off from the future—listening hears 
what it heard, the way it always heard it. This attitude is re-
flected in speaking which then discloses entities the same way 
it tends to listen to them, that is by abstracting them from 
their ground, i..e.., disregarding the temporal context in which 
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they are given. The content becomes interchangeable and the very 
meaning Dasein seeks to cling to in covering its finitude is lost 
to it because of this abstraction. 
This tendency to alienation of the speaker is encouraged by 
"Das Man" in its attempt to banalize any original speaking by 
popularizing it. As speaker it is dispersed into the anonymity 
of publicness so it won't be included in the referential totality 
speech itself discloses. What Is spoken of is confined to the 
ontic level in the effort to retain the ongoing meaning of entities 
so it will have some basis for consideration of its infinity. 
Those s_poken to share in Dasein^'dispersal so that they too will 
not remind Dasein nor be reminded of the finitude of human being. 
Dasein cannot give itself over to publicness completely in 
order to avoid its finitude (although at times it acts as if it 
were possible to become thing—like i*e., not having its being 
as an issue for it,) since it can never completely disown itself. 
If this attitude were fait accompli then there would be no 
possibility of saying yes or no, for Dasein would be unfree and 
completely in the dark. Dasein, as inauthentic speaker, is in 
only partial darkness, how then does it move into the light, 
that is, how does it come to terms with its finitude as surely 
it must if it is to be speaker? 
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In disclosing the world as world, anxiety discloses the 
difference between Dasein and thing in bringing this between 
into focus. It shows Dasein no longer sheltered by the 
qualifying terms ("ever, never, always" etc.) used to extend 
its temporal horizon on an infinite plane. 
Anxiety pursues Dasein especially where, in new situations, 
its old formulations of responding fail it. At those times it is 
literally at a loss for words, for the contextual aspect of the 
situation as a situation is brought into focus quite clearly. 
The stereotypes of speech that it has grown quite attached to 
seem inappropriate, as indeed they are, throwing Dasein back 
upon itself. Anxiety is not limited to situations in which 
there is a disturbing element. Even where it feels its happiest, 
and is most self-assured, this seemingly impregnable position is 
nevertheless subject to anxiety in expressing the thought that 
perhaps such happiness wonft last. At these moments (both sad 
and happy), anxiety brings Dasein's finitude to the foreground. 
But in its attempt to avoid the confrontation with its finitude 
Dasein mistakes the elements in the situation as the "cause" of 
anxiety rather than understanding that the root of its discomfort 
is an ontological one. Thus it rarely confronts the ontological 
dimension of anxiety as such. 
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The primary characterization of inauthentic speech, then, 
is Dasein?s flight from Its finitude in which it seeks to cover 
over its being toward death by attempting to refuse acknowledge-
ment of it in its speaking as speaker, in what is spoken about and 
who is spoken to. Dasein lives in fear of death as that final 
point at which it will change over from one kind of being to 
another. Here especially "Das Man" dictates Dasein?s attitude 
in insisting that death does not concern Dasein except as "One" 
dies. Speaking of death is considered morbid, and so the initial 
fear of death extends itself to any change at all and from there 
to the desire to close itself off from the future, which would 
remind Dasein of its impermanence—and thus of the fact that it has 
not the immortality of a divinity and that mortality is its 
ownmost possibility which it cannot flee no matter how hard it 
tries. It is time that robs Dasein of its immortality. Inau-
thentic speech reflects this determination to extend its finite 
horizon infinitely both in abstracting entities from their ground 
and pronouncing, with aid of words which display a disregard for 
openness to the future e.g., never, ever, always, that the past 
is made present as a static projection distorting time itself. 
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Authentic speech, as an alternative mode of speaking, re-
flects Daseinfs growing awareness of its finitude. It is an 
awareness which displays three constituent elements which 
characterize Dasein as wanderer! a call to such speech; an active 
response to such an appeal which may be characterized as resolution 
to take up the burden of its finitude in its speaking; homecoming 
which brings Dasein, in speaking authentically, to stand in 
proper relationship to being, thus moving "out of the darkness 
and into the light". This passage from the Tragic Protest seems 
especially appropriate herei 
...There is fundamentally only one TRAGEDY FOR 
MAN--THAT OF TIME. 
...The tragic protest speaks not in a devils denial, 
not in a god's acceptancet but in demand of a human 
being to which "No" and "Yes" are both available. 
It is human in its search; tragic in yielding no 
ultimate find; it is protest in finding itself only 
in the search it testifies. It ex-presses no dis-
possession in a void, no possession in fulness, but 
AP-PROPRIATION of being in time... 
This protecting "ap-propriation" should be under-
stood. . .as. . .turning toward a horizon that is there, 
available, to be brought into focus but not into 
existence out of nothing. 1. 
It is the ground of its finitude that is shared in being-with-
others in speaking authentically. In taking up its own task of 
1. TragicProtest, pg. 254 
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coming to grips with its finitude, Dasein calls others to their 
task by letting this ground be "seen" in its speaking, lighting the 
way of others (showing them the way) toward being. Such an invita-
tion is respectful of the others potentiality for being a Self 
whose way toward being might be manifested differently in its 
particularity. 
Resolution thus brings man into position for homecoming, that 
is of dwelling or residing in the between on which his finitude is 
based. Such dwelling in coming to speak authentically, exhibits 
characteristics of both privilege, and anxiety, which are interwoven , 
in the authentic human speech. In speaking authentically man 
"has" the privilege of announcing being by responding to what 
is given in speech. Man discloses his own nature in disclosing 
the being of entities in naming things. The meaning of human 
being is such Saying. Saying is not a possession a man flhas" in 
the sense that it is his property, rather man acknowledges that 
which is granted to him and in so doing in-habits the way that 
becomes him. 
Authentic speech brings man into the clearing, into the 
open, a place where man and being be-long. Conscience as the 
call of care calls man to stand in a proper temporal relationship 
where time as the three ecstases is unified as the horizon on 
which being becomes man. Thus man gathers his finitude as his 
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"ownmost" possibility in which he reaches toward that which 
reaches him. 
Therefore, the fitting relation of the two modes of speech 
may be seen to be non-exclusive, that is, the transformation of 
inauthentic speech does not leave such speech behind: 
Speech is manfs power to anchor himself in 
being...and yet this human power is ever a 
quest; it would not be so in a non-temporal 
realm, where the anchor could stay firm. 
Man!s being in time yields as much hold as 
withdrawal, allows finding and therein 
directs searching...2 
To insist on such exclusionary action would be just as inau-
thentic of authentic speech as when inauthentic speech takes the 
ontic dimension to be the whole of reality.* Communication is 
not putting down one mode and taking up another, rather, communi-
cation is ever man's way to be in which he moves out of the 
2. Tragic Protest, pg. 251 
* Richardson raises the question as to whether authentic Dasein 
would, in forgetting its ontic dimension, be just as inau-
thentic as inauthentic Dasein is in forgetting the ontological 
dimension. "...Would not There-being be equally inauthentic 
if it forgot its ontic dimension and lost itself in a pure 
mysticism or mythicism of Being?" (Through Phenomenology To 
Thought, pg. 51) 
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darkness into the light again and again. Speech discloses 
human being as both darkness and light. Man speaks both inau-
thentically and authentically. Communication is that speaking 
which is both a covering over and an uncovering. This is man's 
way to be. Speech discloses manfs nature as being in decision. 
Referring to Faust in The Tragic Protest, the following passage 
eloquently illuminates all that we have so far proposed: 
The endeavor of human existence is then 
suspended between heaven and hell, between 
light and the night. If negative evil 
cannot seize him in his being, he nonetheless 
cannot seize the perfection of good. The 
sun blinds him, and so does the dark. In 
his own proper twilight of "reflected colour", 
the human being is the movement from night into 
light, the effort to illuminate the search of 
himself. Man gropes to strive ahead and strives 
to grope further. He finds that he misses only 
in reaching for what he misses. ...To be 
human..0he must himself build the path ahead 
on which he himself is to go, 3 
3. ibid, pg. 106 
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